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ABSTRACT
The debate over whether the President, the Senate, or the
Congress has primacy in treaty termination remains unsettled.i
Professor Curtis Bradley incorrectly argues that custom supports
a presidential authority to terminate treaties independently.2
This paper argues that a fuller view of custom, combined with
the Intent of the Framers and functional considerations, shows
*Instructor of International Affairs, Department of Social Sciences, United
States Military Academy. The author would like to thank Michael Glennon and
Antonia Chayes, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
for helpful comments, feedback, and suggestions.
The views expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Department of Defense, the United States Army, the United States Military
Academy, or any other department or agency of the United States Government.
1. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1323 (2008).
2. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 773 (2014).
treaty termination is a shared executive-legislative power.
I. INTRODUCTION
Treaties are an integral part of international relations. They
are the building blocks upon which international relationships
are codified and discussed in international and domestic law.
Treaties and alliances have played a critical role in international
relations since antiquity and have only grown in importance
since the founding of the United States. They have become even
more important as the number of states in the international
system has continued to grow. Since the end of World War I, the
international system has sought to stabilize relations among
nations. Treaties provided the foundation for such stabilization
during the Cold War, acting as a source of cooperation between
the Soviet Union and the United States, most notably within the
arms control process. Such cooperation allowed the two
superpowers to normalize relations in at least one aspect of their
power struggle, based as such negotiations were on mutual trust
that the treaties would bind both parties.
International cooperation and stability are as important now
as in the interwar and Cold War periods. The post-Cold War
peace dividends have given way to increased global tensions and
the return of great power competition. An ongoing debate in the
post-9/11 international system is the longevity of the liberal
international order. Proponents of maintaining the post-World
War II order have viewed executive actions from 2001 to the
present as a possible source of instability, in some cases even
undermining the foundation of international cooperation.
Debate over various aspects of treaty procedures have been a
feature of United States constitutional law since George
Washington's negotiation of the Jay Treaty.3 While the
procedures for treaty ratification are specified in the Treaty
Clause4, the proper authority and procedures for termination are
not. The debate over whether the President, the Senate, or the
3. JOSEPH RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE
DURING THEIR FORMATIVE PERIOD. 90-93 (1920).
4. U.S. CONST. art II, 2.
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Congress has primacy in treaty termination remains unsettled.5
The current administration has undertaken multiple actions that
have raised questions regarding executive authority under the
United States Constitution and made other statements that have
raised the specter of future treaty terminations. Given the
President's espoused views on the value of international
institutions, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) coupled with the administration's notice to withdraw
from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF
Treaty), it does not strain one's imagination to conceive of a
lawsuit contesting the president's authority to unilaterally
terminate treaties that could arise.6
This paper will use a framework based on the Court's general
history of analyzing separation of powers disputes to attempt to
anticipate how the Court would rule if such a case were to
appear. 7 This paper will first focus on the constitutional text and
proceed to trace constitutional case law applicable to treaty
issues. Next, it will discuss custom and close with the intent of
the Framers and functional considerations. This four-part
analysis concludes that if a separation of powers dispute over the
President's authority to terminate treaties unilaterally were to
appear before the Supreme Court and be resolved on its merits,
the Court would rule that the President does not have the
authority to unilaterally terminate self-executing treaties unless
it derives from the exercise of a plenary presidential power.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
The constitutional text does not reveal anything about the
process for terminating treaties, but it does provide a basis for
analyzing the importance and legal weight of treaties. Some
scholars have suggested that something akin to a Rule of Equal
5. Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1323.
6. See Scott R. Anderson, Three Ways to Leave the INF Treaty Lawfare
(Oct. 29, 2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-ways-leave-inf-
treaty; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues Relating to
the NATO Support Act Lawfare (Jan. 28, 2019, 7:43 AM),
https ://www. lawfareblog.com/constitutional-issues -relating-nato-support-act.
7. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 36-70 (1990).
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Formality should apply to the Constitution. Such a rule would,
when interpreting the Constitution, give equal weight to similar
statements in different articles and clauses, and it would favor
similar procedures for "comparable situations and problems."8 A
Rule of Equal Formality would also argue that processes are
reversible. The Constitution lacks explicit instructions for how to
undo certain acts and a Rule of Equal formality would provide
the solution. As Professor Arthur Bestor explains:
The principal concern of the members of these [Constitutional]
conventions was the proper allocation of the various positive
powers of government. Only in exceptional instances did they
give attention to the negative use of these powers - in other
words, to procedures for undoing or reversing what had once
been done.
The silence of the Constitution on a particular point does not
constitute a license to fill the gap with whatever terms or
provisions may happen to strike an officiars or a
commentator's fancy. Obviously the procedure that is supplied
must be consistent with the Constitution's handling of
comparable situations and problems. Like things, it is but
commonsense to say, ought to be done in like ways;
furthermore, the closer the resemblance, the more compelling
the analogy. Logic itself prescribes this rule if different
procedures appear to be deducible from different provisions of
the Constitution.9
This rule is like the constitutive thesis expressed of John 0.
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport in their supermajoritarian
interpretation of the Constitution.10 Both believe that those
similar or identical processes and rules prescribed in the
Constitution should receive equal weight when analyzed. Harold
Koh provides a similar interpretation, describing "a
commonsense 'mirror principle,' whereby absent exceptional
circumstances the degree of congressional participation
8. Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making
and Abrogation of Treaties The Original Intent of the Framers of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WAsH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979).
9. Id. at 17.
10. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002).
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constitutionally required to exit any particular agreement should
mirror the degree of congressional participation that was
required to enter that agreement in the first place."11
The Constitution uses the word "treaty" four times, two of
which give context to understand the importance of treaties
within the constitutional framework and how the treaty power is
separated between the Executive and Legislative branches.12 The
first is the Treaty Clause itself which states the President "shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur."13 The Treaty Clause clearly lays out the process for
making treaties as a joint effort between the President and the
Senate and requiring the consent of a supermajority of the
Senate prior to ratification. The Constitution includes "seven
express supermajority rules" 14 inclusive of the Treaty Clause15.
According to McGinnis and Rappaport:
[i]t should be stressed that these supermajority rules are not
restricted to small or unimportant parts of the Constitution.
They involve some of the most significant matters that affect
the structure of the polity and the nation's political stability -
matters such as impeachments, treaties, and amendments.
They also operate in a wide variety of areas (e.g., foreign and
domestic affairs, constitutional and personal matters) and
apply to a broad range of bodies. 16
The supermajority requirement occurs throughout various
sections of the Constitution and is used to ensure that important
matters are treated with the level of consensus required for such
important matters. That treaties are one of seven instances of
11. Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International
Agreements, 128 YALE L.J. 432, 436 (2018).
12. Hathaway, supra note 1 at 1276 (Prof Hathaway uses this line of
reasoning to lay the framework for her discussion of the history of the Treaty
Clause within the context of the Constitution and international lawmaking).
13. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
14. McGinnis and Rappaport, supra note 10 at 711.
15. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl 2; id. art I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; id.
art. I, § 7, cl 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XII; id. art.
VI1; id. art. V.
16. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 712.
2020] Treaty Termination and the Presidency
supermajority requirements suggests treaties should be
considered as important as the other six instances of
supermajority decisionmaking,17 one of which is the
congressional override of a presidential veto.18 The insistence of a
supermajority for treaty ratification procedures in the
Constitution shows the establishment of treaties is a critical
process requiring great consensus to achieve ratification, just as
the override of a presidential veto requires a supermajority.
These processes were put in place to ensure checks and balances
existed between the coequal branches of government, and these
instances of two-thirds majority requirements stress the
consensus needed for decisions of such import, whether it be a
decision to override a presidential veto or to consent to a treaty.
Supporting the argument that treaties are one of the most
important issues with which the nation will deal, the second
mention of import is in the Supremacy Clause which states
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land."19 The Supremacy Clause
explicitly states treaties are law equal to federal statute.
Through the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution states that
post-presidential negotiation (or possibly joint negotiation with
the Senate in an advice role), followed by a vote of consent with a
supermajority of the Senate, and treaty ratification by the
President, a treaty becomes the supreme Law of the Land. It
follows that once a treaty becomes the Law of the Land, it cannot
be undone by sole executive action as the Executive lacks the
authority to unilaterally terminate laws enacted through other
enumerated constitutional processes.
17. Id. at 710-17 (McGinnis and Rappaport provide an in-depth analysis of
three decision-making processes in the Constitution. Their three processes are
supermajority decisionmaking, ordinary Article I lawmaking, and constitutional
limitations. The first process is the only one that is explicitly written as a
supermajority, implying the importance of the seven instances and suggesting a
level of importance above and beyond Article I procedures. The other two
processes have essences of supermajority requirements but are not explicitly
labeled as such).
18. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.
19. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
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There are multiple arguments against the use of the
Supremacy Clause.20 One argument comes from the 1979 Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations which believed "treaties are not
like statutes in one significant respect."21 The Committee argued:
[a]lthough the Congress has the last word in determining
whether a statute is enacted, the Senate merely authorizes the
ratification of the treaty; it is the President's role that is
determinative. He decides at the outset whether to commence
treaty negotiations. He decides whether to sign a treaty. He
decides whether to seek Senate advice and consent. And he
decides whether to exchange instruments of ratification' after a
treaty has been approved by the Senate. At each of these
stages, it is the President who has the power to determine
whether to proceed and thus whether treaty relations will
ultimately exist. It is not illogical, therefore, to conclude that
the President's authority may include the right to terminate
treaty relations.22
This counter-argument o the Supremacy Clause is simple,
but the logic does not follow. That the President can terminate a
treaty because he exchanges the final instrument of ratification
does not mean that the President may then decide to terminate
the treaty at any time. A treaty is a contract between two
sovereign powers, and, therefore, both sovereign parties must
agree in order for the contract to be binding.23 Should the
President present the instrument of ratification to the other
party or parties and they decide not to reciprocate, no treaty
exists. The acceptance of the instrument by the other sovereign
finalizes the contract, at which point, it becomes law under the
Supremacy Clause, not the act of presentation by the President.
Another example is the attachment of Reservations,
Understandings, or Declarations (RUDs) creating a point of
contention. "When the Senate approves a treaty, it can condition
its consent... either by requiring the president to get the other
party to agree to a change in the treaty's text, or simply by
20. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 150-51.
21. Id. at 150.
22. S. REP. No. 96-7, at 18 (1979).
23. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
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including its condition in the resolution of ratification."24 Such
RUDs are the purview of the Senate, and while they may be
acceptable to the President, they may not be acceptable to the
other party or parties. These RUDs are binding, and the
President is "constitutionally required to respect the Senate's
conditions."25 This does not mean that the President must move
forward with ratification. Should the President disagree with any
RUD and feel the treaty should no longer move forward, the
President may decide not to present the instrument of
ratification or withdraw the treaty from consideration in the
Senate. If the President decided to continue and present the
instrument of ratification, given no objection to the RUDs, the
Senate's RUDs would be an important factor in the other party's
decision whether to accept the instrument of ratification. This
example is like the first in that the other party or parties to the
treaty must finalize the act by accepting the conditioned treaty in
the instrument of ratification. In both examples, it is not the
President's decision to present the instrument of ratification that
finalizes the treaty. Rather, it is the acceptance of the treaty by
the other party or parties that puts the treaty into force.
If one were to follow the Committee's logic and accept that
the President has the power to terminate a treaty because the
President decides whether to present the instrument of
ratification, other constitutional problems would arise. If one
accepts such a "last-to-touch" argument, it would follow that
Congress could make that argument regarding laws enacted
because Congress has the final say in whether a Bill or Joint
Resolution becomes law through their ability to override a
presidential veto they could rescind a law through unilateral
congressional action in the form of a concurrent resolution,
bypassing the President entirely. Instead, there is no method for
unilateral congressional action to unmake a law except for the
override of a presidential veto by a two-thirds majority as written
in the Constitution. Laws are unmade through the same process
in which they are made, despite this process not appearing in the
24. Michael J. Glennon, What the New Arms Treaty Would Do, N.Y. TIMES,
November 16, 2010, at A32.
25. Id.
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Constitution. "It is well settled that the same process that applies
to the making of federal statutes... also must be followed for the
termination of federal statutes."26 As Senator Goldwater argued
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
it is true the Constitution is silent on treaty termination. But I
[Senator Goldwater] would remind you that article I, section 7,
is also silent on how a bill which becomes a law shall be
terminated. Yet I am unaware of anyone in the executive
branch arguing that the President can repeal a law on his own.
In fact, there is a Supreme Court decision which says the
President cannot terminate a law by his own action.27
The President cannot unmake a law,28 and neither can
Congress unmake a law except by following the same process
required to make a law.
Senator Harry F. Byrd Jr. used this same argument in the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during its hearings on
Treaty Termination.29 In his opening statement Senator Byrd
said "[t]here is no disagreement, I [Senator Byrd] am sure, with
the assertion that under our Constitution the President of the
United States clearly shares the treaty-making process with the
Senate of the United States. Does he not then share the treaty-
terminating power in the Senate?"30 Senator Byrd acknowledged
the silence of the Constitution on the subject of treaty
termination3i but likened it to the Constitution's silence "in
explaining how statutes are terminated. The Constitution
describes carefully the process of creating a law; but nowhere
does it describe the process of nulifying [sic] a law."32 Yet even
without this enumeration of how to nullify a law, Senator Byrd
26. Bradley, supra note 2, at 781.
27. TREATY TERMINATION: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 22 (1979) (statement
of Sen. Barry Goldwater) [hereinafter TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS].
28. Bruce Ackerman, Treaties Don't Belong To Presidents Alone, N.Y.
TIMES, August 29, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/29/opinion/treaties-
don-t-belong-to-presidents -alone.html.
29. TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 27.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 6.
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argued using the Supremacy Clause that "[a]ll of us know that a
President cannot unilaterally terminate a law; yet a treaty is
law. To hold that a President can nullify a treaty is to assign to
the President the power unilaterally to set aside a law, because a
treaty is a law and is so recognized."33
This argument received majority support in the Senate. On
January 18, 1979 Senator Byrd proposed Senate Resolution 15 -
A Resolution concerning Mutual Defense Treaties34 which was
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations March 8,
1979. This referral was the reason for the Treaty Termination
Hearings in April, 1979 during which Senator Byrd made the
above arguments. Following the hearings, the Senate Report of
the Treaty Termination Hearings referred Senate Resolution 15
back to the Senate with amendments. These amendments
expanded the scope of the resolution to encompass all treaties
and affirmed significant unilateral presidential authority
supported by the Committee's counter to the Supremacy Clause
Argument.35
33. Id. at 6.
34. See S. RES. 15, 96TH CONG., (1979). The original text of S. Res. 15 as
introduced by Senator Byrd read "Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate
that approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual
defense treaty between the United States and another nation." Id. reprinted in
TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS, at 2.
35. See 125 CONG. REC., 13,672 (1979). The description and verbiage of S.
Res. 15 with amendments from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as
read by the assistant legislative clerk during floor debate was as follow:
A resolution (S. Res. 15) concerning mutual defense treaties.
Without objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 15)
which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations with an
amendment o strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:
That it is the sense of the Senate that treaties or treaty provisions to which the
United States is a party should not be terminated or suspended by the
President without the concurrence of the Congress except where -
(1)The treaty provision in question have been superseded by a subsequent,
inconsistent statute or treaty; or
(2)Material breach, changed circumstances, or other factors recognized by
international law, or provisions of the treaty itself, give rise to a right of
termination or suspension on the part of the United States; but in no event
where such termination or suspension would -
(A)result in the imminent involvement of United States Armed Forces in
hostilities or otherwise seriously and directly endanger the security of the
United States Armed Forces in hostilities or otherwise seriously and directly
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Immediately after S. Res. 15 rose for debate on June 6,
Senator Byrd proposed an amendment to change the Committee
version of the resolution back to the original as he had sponsored
in January.36 During the subsequent debate, Senator Richard
Schweiker argued in support of Senator Byrd's amendment.
Removed of legal complexities, the issue can be stated quite
simply: If the Senate is an active party in the formulation of an
international commitment, then it follows logically that it
should likewise express itself on the validity or otherwise of
abrogating that commitment. The Senate can hardly be
accused of usurping a power which the Constitution confers
upon it. On the contrary, for the Senate to disavow such
responsibility through language similar to that proposed by the
committee, would effectively place this body in contempt of its
duly recognized authority.37
At the end of this debate, the Senate voted in favor of Senator
Byrd's amendment with 59 Yeas, 35 Nays, and six not voting.38
The Senate majority rejected the recommendation of the
Committee on Foreign Relations and adopted Senator Byrd's
original resolution language. While the Committee's version of S.
Res. 15 resulted from the logic explained in their report,39 the
Senate majority rejected this logic and voted in favor of
maintaining Senate involvement in the treaty termination
process.40 At the heart of the argument endorsed by the majority
endanger the security of the United States; or
(B)be inconsistent with the provisions of-
(i)a condition set forth in the resolution of ratification to a particular treaty; or
(ii)a joint resolution; specifying a procedure for the termination or suspension of
such treaty.
Id. See also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 13,672. The verbiage of the amendment was "Strike out the
committee substitute and substitute in heu thereof the following: 'That it is the
sense of the Senate that approval of the United States Senate is required to
terminate any mutual defense treaty between the United States and another
nation."' (Id. at 13,672).
37. Id. at 13,695.
38. Id. at 13,696.
39. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
40. S. Res. 15 never received a final vote to dispose of the issue. As of
October 18, 1979, S. Res. 15 remained on the Senate calendar but was not voted
on in its final, post-Byrd Amendment form. Senator Church had at one point
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of the Senate during this debate was that the Senate, a
constitutionally-required participant in treaty creation, should
also be present in the decisions of treaty termination. Senators
Byrd and Schweiker essentially argued the underlying concept of
Koh's mirror principle or a Rule of Equal Formality and
persuaded most of their colleagues.
The requirement for equal processes in making and
terminating treaties, just as in making and repealing laws,
seems especially clear following "the Supreme Court's decision in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, which held the legislative veto
unconstitutional."41 As Professor Oona Hathaway states, "[r]ead
more broadly - and in the context of other related decisions - the
Court arguably held [in Chadha] not simply that the particular
form of the legislative veto is unconstitutional, but that Congress
cannot shortcut the lawmaking process."42 Just as Congress lacks
the capacity to shortcut the process to unmake laws, so too does
the Executive. As Professor Koh asks, "[i]f the President cannot
enact or repeal a statute alone, why should he be able to repeal
the duly enacted law of the land - and its accompanying
framework of deeply internalized domestic law - just because the
initiating juridical act happened to be in treaty form?"43 There is
proposed an amendment to Senator Byrd's language which would prevent S.
Res. 15 from applying retroactively yet this amendment did not receive a floor
vote either. During discussions on S. Res. 15 within a heading of "U.S. District
Court Ruling on Termination of Mutual Defense Treaty With Taiwan" Senator
Robert C. Byrd argued that should a vote have occurred, 'Ji]t is quite
conceivable that the Senate could have rejected [S. Res. 15] after having
approved the amendment, which in effect would have killed the amendment. So
the record should show that the Senate did not pass any resolution that
declared its view that the Taiwan Treaty could not be terminated without
Senate approval." Senator Harry F. Byrd Jr. responded to this statement with
the opposite sentiment. "June 6, 1979, the Senate, by a vote of 59 to 35, adopted
my [Senator Harry F. Byrd Jr.'s] proposal that no mutual defense treaty
between the United States and any other nation could be abrogated without
Senate approval. While the resolution itself was not formally adopted, the
Senate spoke loud and clear as to the merits on the issue." (125. Cong. Rec.,
28,724-25). While Sen. R. Byrd is correct that no resolution would exist, the
floor vote would likely provide a valid sense of the Congress that the Supreme
Court would take into consideration. (See infra note 235).
41. Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1333-34.
42. Id. at 1333, n.283.
43. Koh, supra note 11, at 458.
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no process for unmaking or repealing statute in the Constitution,
just as there is no process for terminating a treaty. The Court's
rationale for its ruling Chadha stated that "[a]mendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with
Art. I."44 This suggests the Court would view amendment45 or
termination of a treaty as requiring conformation with Article II
procedures given treaty ratification requires presentment of a
treaty to the Senate. Such an interpretation according to a Rule
of Equal Formality would suggest that the President lacks the
authority to unilaterally withdraw from a treaty that is self-
executing, or from a non-self-executing treaty that Congress has
proceeded to execute through subsequent legislation.
One may argue that such an argument is circular as it
assumes Article II of the United States Constitution requires
congressional inclusion. However, no assumption is necessary.
The Treaty Clause specifically includes the Senate in an Article
II power. There is no circularity to the argument if Senate
involvement is specified in the text. Furthermore, arguing that
an assumption of congressional involvement in treaty
termination is in some way circular presupposes that treaty
termination is an Article II power which it clearly is not as the
text of the Constitution does not mention treaty termination. The
lack of an enumerated power to terminate treaties under any
article of the Constitution is the reason there is a debate as to
where that power resides. Therefore, arguing an assumption of
congressional involvement in an Article II power presupposes the
antecedent question as to where such a power resides.
Analysis of the constitutional text does not present a
definitive answer on presidential termination powers, but it does
suggest one. Through the lenses of a Rule of Equal Formality and
Professor Koh's mirror principle, particularly considering
44. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
45. Treaty amendment has not presented itself outside of a few instances
and has never been ruled on by the Court. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 798-
799. Prof. Bradley discusses President McKinley's termination of treaty
provisions in an 1850 U.S. -Switzerland commercial treaty. Prof. Bradley notes,
aside from the fact that this was the first example of the President proceeding
unilaterally, that McKinley's actions followed the Tariff Act of 1897 which can
be argued to have established McKinley's authority to proceed with the
termination of certain provisions within the 1850 treaty.
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Chadha's focus on respecting constitutional processes, textual
analysis leans towards a lack of executive authority. As Professor
Koh points out, quoting Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Chadha:
whether "a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. [P]olicy
arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" are
subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines
powers and. . . sets out just how those powers are to be
exercised."46
Chief Justice Burger's argument suggests that, as treaties
were meant to be difficult to enact given the supermajority
requirement, expediency and ease for the President in his duties
as the "sole organ" for foreign affairs would not justify such
expansive executive powers regarding treaty termination.47 But
given the lack of a textually explicit process for terminating a
treaty, the Constitution is only the first portion of the analysis.
After analyzing the constitutional text, one should proceed to
case law and then to any congressional or executive customs that
have developed outside of judicial review.48
III. CASE LAW
The courts have never ruled specifically on the question of
treaty termination. Despite the lack of a definitive ruling on
treaty termination, it is possible to trace early judicial precedent
dealing with other aspects of treaties to get a sense of the
Judicial Branch's views on treaty powers. Early case law
surrounding the treaty power does not deal with the question of
treaty termination itself, but its discussion is illuminating. Early
opinions do not even discuss the possibility of executive authority
to terminate treaties. This section will follow these discussions
and trace the Court's ever-expanding view of Executive authority
46. Koh, supra note 11, at 451.
47. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
48. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 774, 783-785; Michael J. Glennon, The
Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109
(1984): GLENNON, supra note 7, at 53-70, 151.
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which coincides with a growth of Executive power in foreign
relations at large.
Early case law dealing with treaty issues, albeit not treaty
termination, supports the Supremacy Clause argument that
treaties, once completed, are equivalent to Article I enacted laws.
In 1829, Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the
Court in Foster v. Neilson which dealt with a land dispute and an
1819 treaty between the United States and Spain where the
Court ruled that some treaties require enactment of legislation to
gain effect.49 In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall differentiated
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and how
each type should be interpreted under the Supremacy Clause. He
stated unequivocally, "[o]ur constitution declares a treaty to be
the law of the land."50 He then described self-executing treaties
as those treaties which require no legislation to yield domestic
effect, and non-self-executing treaties as those treaties which
"the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court."51 This dichotomy established the requirement
for Congress to enact laws in order for non-self-executing treaties
to become domestic law; it does not impact the immediate status
of self-executing treaties as law. Chief Justice Marshall clearly
viewed self-executing treaties as law, not a separate entity to be
afforded the same status as a law, with some exceptions, as the
Senate Committee argued.52
In Taylor v. Morton, a case regarding hemp duties and the
1832 United States Treaty with Russia as it conflicted with the
Tariff Act of 1842,53 the court affirmed the last-in-time rule as
applicable to treaties. 54 Justice Curtis, writing for the Circuit
Court of Massachusetts relied on Chief Justice Marshall's
framework for determining self-executing versus non-self-
executing statutes.55 Justice Curtis, in discussing the execution
of certain clauses in the treaty, observed:
49. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
50. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 314.
52. S. REP. No. 96-7, supra note 22.
53. 5. Stat. 548 (1842).
54. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 787 (1855).
55. Id. at 787.
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[i]t must be admitted,. . . that in general, power to legislate on
a particular subject, includes power to modify and repeal
existing laws on that subject, and either substitute new laws in
their place, or leave the subject without regulation, in which
the repealed laws applied. There is therefore nothing in the
mere fact that a treaty is a law, which would prevent congress
from repealing it. Unless it is for some reason distinguishable
from other laws, the rule which it gives may be displaced by
the legislative power, at its pleasure.56
Justice Curtis distinguished a treaty as different, not from a
law, but from an act of Congress. However, he concluded that
this differentiation is inconsequential as it suggests a treaty,
once it becomes law, may be terminated through congressional
legislation, not only through a joint effort of the Executive and
Senate which excludes the House of Representatives.57
"Ordinarily, it is certainly true that the powers of enacting and
repealing laws reside in the same persons. But there is no
reason, in the nature of things, why it may not be otherwise."58
Justice Curtis concluded:
[t]hat the people of the United States have deprived their
government of this power [to modify or repeal a law found in a
treaty] in any case, I do not believe. That it must reside
somewhere, and be applicable to all cases, I am convinced. I
feel no doubt that it belongs to congress. That, inasmuch as
treaties must continue to operate as part of our municipal law,
and be obeyed by the people, applied by the judiciary and
executed by the president, while they continue unrepealed, and
inasmuch as the power of repealing these municipal laws must
reside somewhere, and no body other than congress possesses
56. Id. at 785.
57. Justice Curtis argued:
the constitution... gives to congress, in so many words, power to declare war,
an act which, ipso jure, repeals all provisions of all existing treaties with the
hostile nation, inconsistent with a state of war. It is true this particular power
to repeal laws found in treaties, is expressly given, and is applicable only to a
case of war; but, in the first place, it is sufficient to prove the position stated
above, that there is nothing, in the nature of things, which requires that the
same persons who make the law by a treaty, should alone have power to repeal
it.
Id. at 786.
58. Id. at 785-86.
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it, then legislative power is applicable to such laws whenever
they relate to subjects, which the constitution has placed under
that legislative power. In conformity with these views was the
action of congress in passing the act of July 7, 1798 (1 Stat.
578), declaring the treaties with France no longer obligatory on
the United States.59
The logic for including congressional legislation as a valid
instrument for treaty termination or modification relies on the
plenary powers of Congress and argues that it should be included
alongside action by the President and the Senate.60 While Justice
Curtis did not discuss whether he viewed termination as an
exclusive or joint power, the lack of discussion of executive
unilateral authority would continue for nearly a century.
The Supreme Court reiterated a similar view in its discussion
of La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States. In that case, the
Court noted, "[i]t has been adjudged that Congress by legislation,
and so far as the people and authorities of the United States are
concerned, could abrogate a treaty made between this country
and another country which had been negotiated by the President
and approved by the Senate."61 Again, this discussion does not
discuss exclusivity despite the fact that the case dealt in part
with Executive authority, albeit over legislation and not treaties.
It is important to note the use of "abrogate" in the Court's
discussion. Modern legal thought differentiates between
termination and abrogation. Professor Michael Glennon writes,
"[t]reaty termination is... different, constitutionally, from treaty
abrogation. A treaty is terminated when it is brought to an end in
accordance with its terms. A treaty is abrogated when it is
59. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899)
citing Head Money cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Chinese Exclusion case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 721 (1893). This case dealt with a
dispute over damages awarded by a commission created in an 1868 treaty
between the U.S. and Mexico and whether subsequent legislation of 1892
directing the Secretary of State make inquiries into fraudulent evidence was
valid given it was signed during a congressional recess. The Court held that the
1892 act was valid.
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brought to an end in violation of its terms."62 The Restatements
also make this point.6 3 However, other writings fail to distinguish
between termination and abrogation in a strict sense4 or seem to
use them interchangeably.65 This confusion in modern law makes
it difficult to determine when such a differentiation would have
occurred historically.
Furthering this ambiguity, "[i]t is worth noting... that
although clauses in treaties allowing for unilateral withdrawal
are now common, they were not common at the time of the
founding. Indeed, it appears that the United States did not
become a party to a treaty containing a unilateral withdrawal
clause until 1822."66 The lack of withdrawal clauses at the time of
the Founding and their incorporation during the nineteenth
century makes it difficult to determine whether one should
consider "abrogation" in earlier rulings distinct from termination
pursuant to a withdrawal clause or if the intent of the ruling was
to use them interchangeably. Two post-La Abra cases suggest the
term has been used interchangeably by different courts. In Van
Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co.67 the Court for the first time
mentions the possibility that the President could terminate a
treaty unilaterally. This case involved the termination of an 1827
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the U.S. and
Norway by the later-in-time Seaman's Act of March 4, 1915 (38
Stat. 1164). While the Congressional authority to terminate a
62. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 158.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 339 (Am. LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. See also
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
313 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)].
64. Bradley, supra note 2.
65. J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J.
LEGIS. 46 (1978) (discussing treaty abrogation as a general concept but
contemporaneously with the treaty termination of the Sino-American Mutual
Defense Treaty). Mr. Emerson, writing at the time as Senator Goldwater's
Counsel, argues that the termination of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan
is an attempt at presidential abrogation of a treaty. This seems to be an
expansive reading of abrogation insofar as the Sino-American Mutual Defense
Treaty (6 UST 433) in Article X contains a withdrawal clause with a one-year
notice and suggests he is using the terms interchangeably. Id.
66. Bradley, supra note 2, at 778-79.
67. 297 U.S. 114 (1936).
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treaty via a later-in-time statute is not the question, this is the
first mention of a unilateral Executive termination power. Not
only does this case mention Executive authority, it also
highlights the interchangeable use of terminate and abrogate.
Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
[t]he [respondent's] first and second points are unavailing, if
Article XIII was actually abrogated in its entirety, and that
this was the purport of the diplomatic exchanges between the
two Governments is beyond dispute. As to the [respondent's]
third point, we think that the question as to the authority of
the Executive in the absence of congressional action, or of
action by the treaty-making power, to denounce a treaty of the
United States, is not here involved. In this instance, the
Congress requested and irected the President to give notice of
the termination of the treaty provisions in conflict with the
Act.68
While Chief Justice Hughes specifies that this case is not
relevant to the question of Executive power in treaty
termination, it does highlight the simultaneous utilization of the
terms abrogate and terminate, neither of which he defined. This
suggests that through the 1930s the two terms were
interchangeable so far as the Court was concerned. While this
differentiation is more common now, it does not appear to have
been so from the Founding through the early twentieth century.
Of note, this is an early reference of the Court to the concept of
Executive termination powers that coincides with the rising
scholarly and Executive arguments in support of such a power.6 9
The other cases cited in this paper have only described an
Executive power in conjunction with Senate termination or
Congressional termination and have not even discussed a
unilateral Executive power in dicta. While this is not conclusive
evidence nor applicable to any future ruling of the Court, it does
suggest that the views of the Court may have shifted alongside
scholarly arguments and the legal opinions of the State
68. Id. at 117-18.
69. Bradley, supra note 2, at 816-19 (discussing the shift in scholarly
literature beginning in 1910 with a lone argument that the Executive possessed
an independent power to terminate treaties which grew until it became a
prevalent opinion in the 1940s).
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Department.
Shortly before Van Der Weyde, Judge Cardozo's opinion in
Techt v. Hughes,70 a case dealing with the validity of a treaty
between the United States and Austria following a declaration of
war, touched on two critical issues. First, in his determination of
"whether a treaty shall be observed in the absence of some
declaration by the political departments of the government that
it has been suspended or annulled"71 during a time of war, Judge
Cardozo concluded that the "President and senate may denounce
the treaty, and thus terminate its life. Congress may enact an
inconsistent rule. The treaty of peace itself may set up new
relations, and terminate earlier compacts either tacitly or
expressly."72 Judge Cardozo described two methods of
termination. One as a joint function of the President and the
Senate and the second by the Congress pursuant to its legislative
70. 229 N.Y. 222 (1920).
71. Judge Cardozo cites Circuit Justice Jay in Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas.
1059 (1800) where Jay provides a detailed analysis of the question of treaty
annulment by the various "departments". He concludes that the judiciary lacks
the authority to annul a treaty. In his opinion he writes "[o]n comparing the
principles which govern and decide the necessary validity of a treaty. . . we
cannot but perceive that the former are of a judicial, and that the latter are of a
political nature. (Id. at 1062) He continues by discussing the functional
considerations of treaty annulation. "When it is considered that the voluntary
validity of treaties. . . is to be decided not by fixed and immutable rules and
principles, but entirely by prudential considerations, the inexpediency of
committing its decision to two concurrent jurisdictions, that is to the judiciary
and to congress ... " (Id. at 1062, (emphasis added)). He concludes his analysis
in two sections. First:
[elvery law derives its obligation from the will of those who had authority to
enact it. Every treaty derives its obligation from the will of those who had
authority to conclude it. Neither of them can be repealed or annulled but by the
will of those who have authority to repeal or annual them.
Id. 1062-1063. The second, which Judge Cardozo cites, is:
[t]hat on the distribution of the sovereignty into the three departments, of
executive, legislative and judicial, the authority in question became incidental
to the latter. No right can be incident to one department which necessarily goes
to the suspension of a right incident to another, or to control, suspend or defeat
its operation. If this principle be just, it follows that, where the department
authorized to annul a voidable treaty shall deem it most conducive to the
national interest that it should no longer continue to be obeyed and observed, no
right can be incident to the judiciary to declare it void in a single instance.
Id. at 1063.
72. Techt v. Hughes, supra note 70, at 243.
powers. The second point was that pursuant to the Allied Powers'
victory in World War I, "[t]he proposed treaties with Germany
and Austria give the victorious powers the privilege of choosing
the treaties which are to be kept in force or abrogated."73 The
transition from the peace treaty terminating "earlier compacts"74
and the selection of treaties "to be kept in force or abrogated"75
implies some sort of interchangeability between the terms.
Twenty-seven years later, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion
for Clark v. Allen, a World War II case dealing with inheritance
rights under a treaty in existence prior to a declaration of war.7 6
In the opinion, he noted that during a time of war regarding
treaty obligations "the Chief Executive or the Congress may have
formulated a national policy quite inconsistent with the
enforcement of a treaty in whole or in part... [t]his was the view
stated in Techt v. Hughes... and we believe it to be the correct
one."77 Justice Douglas then quoted a significant portion of the
Techt v. Hughes opinion to include the sections quoted supra.78
The Court's inclusion of the specific language dealing with
presidential and senatorial termination or congressional
termination is not modified, either in the quote or subsequently
in dicta, and does not include sole presidential termination. The
only mention of unilateral executive action is the suggestion that
the Chief Executive may have created a policy at odds with




76. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). This case dealt with the question of inheritance
rights of foreign nationals under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
consular Rights with Germany, December 8, 1923 (44 Stat. 2132) following the
outbreak of hostilities and declarations of war in World War II between the
United States and Germany. The Court held that the treaty remained valid
despite a declaration of war citing Techt v. Hughes.
77. Id. at 508-09.
78. Id. at 509-10.
79. Id. at 508-09. See also id. at 510:
We do not think that the national policy expressed in the Trading with the
Enemy Act, as amended, is incompatible with the right of inheritance granted
German aliens under Article IV of the treaty. It is true that since the
declaration of war on December 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 796), the Act and the
Executive Orders issued thereunder have prohibited the entry of German
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of presidential authority to suspend or abrogate a limited portion
of a treaty, although it is quite explicit that any action on the
part of the Executive would be through the creation of a
conflicting policy, not a specific unilateral decision to terminate
or abrogate a portion of a treaty. Given the Court's discussion of
executive authority and the issue of treaty validity pursuant to a
declaration of war and the President's commander-in-chief
powers, the omission of unilateral Executive termination in the
discussion suggests the Court did not see it as valid. Techt v.
Hughes and Clark v. Allen are notable as they were cases
brought following World War I and World War II respectively.
Both cases dealt with the presidency during its peak power as
Commander-in-Chief following a declaration of war by the
Congress, yet neither of them expanded nor mentioned uniliteral
termination of treaties. Both cases, Clark citing Techt, specified
joint Executive-Senate action or sole Congressional action as
methods of termination. The only hint of a presidential authority
to terminate a treaty was the suggestion that an executive action
undertaken as the Commander-in-Chief may impact the
Executive's ability to enforce a treaty during times of war, but
this was in dicta and the cases did not touch on Executive treaty
terminations and therefore have provided no legal precedent.
The post-1900 cases discussed supra occurred during a
significant transition period for the country. The United States
was culminating its assent to replace Britain as the dominant
global power, a journey that would end in 1945, just two years
before Clark v. Allen, after a tumultuous interwar period
characterized by American retrenchment and the Great
Depression. As a result of two globe-spanning wars and a global
economic depression, the presidency had experienced an
unprecedented expansion of authority. This included a
broadening of the Executive's interpretation of its foreign affairs
power which would only continue to increase throughout the Cold
nationals into this country, have outlawed communications or transactions of a
commercial character with them, and have precluded the removal of money or
property from this country for their use or account. We assume that these
provisions abrogate the parts of Article IV of the treaty dealing with the
liquidation of the inheritance and the withdrawal of the proceeds, even though
the act provides that the prohibited activities and transactions may be licensed.
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War.80 Executive power in the realm of treaties increased with
little to no Congressional resistance and no applicable case law
for over thirty years. Despite this growth of Executive power,
joint action continued contemporaneously through President
Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.
Many scholars have analyzed Goldwater v. Carter81 despite
the fact the Supreme Court remanded it to the District Court for
dismissal. A large portion of this analysis concerned the
justiciability of the case, although it now seems the justiciability
question no longer applies following Zivotofsky v. Clinton.82
Should Goldwater v. Carter have been granted certiorari, it is
possible the Court would have ruled in favor of the President.
Analyzing Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry,83 specifically the discussion of President Carter's
termination of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan,84 one can
infer a post-Zivotofsky Court might well have ruled in Goldwater
v. Carter that Executive termination was constitutional pursuant
to the President's plenary power85 under the Recognition
Clause.86 However, it is unlikely the Court would have given the
President a broad authority to terminate any treaty outside of
the scope of the Executive's Recognition Power. This is the
argument Justice Brennan put forward in his lone dissent,
80. Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998).
81. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
82. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012). See also Koh, supra note 11,
at 444.
83. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
84. Id. at 2093-95.
85. Terence Smith, Link to Taiwan Ends, N.Y. TIMES, December 16, 1978,
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/16/archives/hnk-to-taiwan-ends-carter-in-tv-
speech-says -we-recognize-reahty.html (last visited Nov 30, 2018). President
Carter stated: "[T]he United States of America recognizes the Government of
the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China," and
informed reporters that the U.S. would terminate diplomatic relations and the
mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as a result of the recognition of the People's
Republic of China."
86. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. See also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
2084-95 (2015) (Justice Kennedy's history and acknowledgement of the
President's recognition power and its derivation from the Reception Clause);
Koh, supra note 11 (providing analysis of the Goldwater decision focused on the
President's recognition power).
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stating he would "affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it rests upon the President's well-established authority
to recognize, and withdraw recognition from foreign
governments."87 Justice Brennan continued in his dissent,
touching on the question of which branch has the authority to
terminate treaties:
[t]he issue of decision making authority must be resolved as a
matter of constitutional law, not political discretion;
accordingly, it falls within the competence of the courts. The
constitutional question raised here is prudently answered in
narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan
was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking
Government, because the defense treaty was predicated upon
the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the
only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly
establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone
the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign
regimes. That mandate being clear, our judicial inquiry into
the treaty rupture can go no further.88
Goldwater v. Carter may be an important benchmark for
defining the power of the Executive in treaty termination, but it
seems likely that it will define an exception to the rule, rather
than provide the foundation for more expansive executive
authority.
The seminal case for separation of powers disputes is
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.89 Professor Koh views
treaty termination according to the Justice Jackson's
frameworko and argues "[i]n contrast to an overbroad unilateral
87. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
88. Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
89. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer_343 U.S. 579(1952.
90. Justice Jackson's landmark concurrence in Youngstown famously set
forth three familiar categories of executive action:
Youngstown Category One: "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate";
Youngstown Category Two: "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
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presidential termination 'rule,' the mirror principle does not
mandate a 'one-size-fits-all' mode of agreement termination.
Instead, depending on the substance and entry process, the
mirror principle requires varying degrees of congressional and
executive participation to exit from various kinds of international
agreements."91 He argues the types of international agreements
(sole executive agreements, treaties, and congressional-executive
agreements) roughly map to Jackson's three categories and
following the mirror principle, such an analysis should in part
determine withdrawal authority.92 According to Koh, "the mirror
principle is simply a variant of the famous 'last-in-time rule."'93
The second factor he discusses is the substance of an agreement.
When applying the second factor, Professor Koh states "which
branch of government has substantive constitutional prerogatives
regarding that area of foreign policy94 influences the termination
requirement alongside the first factor. Professor Koh argues for
reciprocal processes for treaty termination, analogous to the
accepted process for repealing federal statutes and laws. It would
then follow that while the Youngstown framework is helpful in
determining some specifics regarding treaty termination
authorities, the Court should not rely on Jackson's second
category as justification for absolute executive power in the face
of congressional silence. Rather, the Court should view it as
falling into the "twilight zone"95 and treat it as a "concurrent
power shared with either the full Congress or the Senate."96 Just
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain"; and
Youngstown Category Three: "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.'
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson
J., concurring).
Koh, supra note 11, at 461-63 n.130.
91. Id. at 461.
92. Id. at 462-63.
93. Id. at 457.
94. Id. at 462.
95. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-611
(1952).
96. Bradley, supra note 2, at 824.
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as the Court would not accept unilateral presidential authority to
rescind a law passed by Congress, neither should they accept a
unilateral presidential authority to terminate treaties.97
Congress should not have to act preemptively to keep the
President from unilaterally terminating treaties.98 Such
executive power to act unilaterally should only apply to certain
cases where termination is pursuant to a plenary presidential
power, such as in Goldwater where termination authority was
asserted under the Recognition Power.99
The next attempt by individual members of Congress to
prevent a presidential treaty termination came in 2002 following
President George W. Bush's announcement that the U.S. would
withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM
Treaty) with Russia. 100 In Kucinich v. BushiOl Judge Bates found
the Senators lacked standing under Raines v. Byrdo2 and relied
heavily on Goldwater v. Carter to determine the question was
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.03 Similar to
Goldwater v. Carter, Kucinich v. Bush would likely reach the
Court on its merits following Zivoto/sky . Unlike Goldwater v.
Carter, Kucinich v. Bush would require the Court to decide if the
Executive possesses the power to terminate treaties unilaterally.
But unlike Goldwater v. Carter, Kucinich v. Bush does not fall
under a plenary presidential power and President Bush's
termination would most likely be ruled unconstitutional. As for
the enduring strength of Kucinich v. Bush for the historical gloss,
97. Id. at 786-87, 821.
98. Arguments have arisen that Congress could preempt such confusion
through a few methods. These include legislation passing a law that prohibits
unilateral presidential action or placing such a prohibition in a RUD for each
treaty during the advice and consent process. See GLENNON, supra note 7, at
123-63 for a discussion of congressional remedies.
99. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
100. Terence Neilan, Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a
Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, December 13, 2001,
https ://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/internationallbush-pulls-out-of-abm-
treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html.
101. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2002).
102. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (holding that appellees did not
have a sufficient personal stake in the dispute and did not allege a sufficiently
concrete injury to have established standing under the constitution).
103. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 at 32-49.
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the Congress eventually funded President Bush's Ballistic
Missile Defense Plans104 as Bradley notes.105 This action would
move President Bush's action from Bradley's06 fourth category,
unilateral presidential termination, to his third category,
termination with post hoc congressional or senatorial approval,
adding it to the continued custom of Senate involvement as
opposed to an extension of unilateral executive authority.
Kucinich v. Bush is the type of case that Professor Koh
envisions arising should the current administration attempt to
terminate any treaties without congressional involvement.07 As
this section traced, the general view of treaty termination custom
has shifted since the founding, most noticeably in the twentieth
century.10S This shift coincides with a growth in American
involvement in foreign affairs born of the United States'
participation in two world wars and its subsequent position as a
Cold War superpower. As Professor Bradley comments in his
analysis, "[n]ational security soon became directly relevant to the
issue of treaty termination and suspension" following World War
1.109 This trend towards deference to the Executive in foreign
affairs and national security has concurrently shifted customary
treaty practices. More than one hundred years of cooperation
between the Congress and the President shifted significantly
towards executive unilateralism.
IV. FRAMERS' INTENT & FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Next, the Court should look at the intent of the Framers in
their analysis. Discussion of the Framers' Intent cannot be
104. Paul Richter, Senate GOP Wins Funding Battle for Missile Defense, Los
ANGELES TIMES, June 27, 2002, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-
jun-27-na-missile27-story.html.
105. Bradley, supra note 2, at 816.
106. See infra Section V of this paper, especially nn.217-18 and
accompanying text.
107. Koh, supra note 11, at 432-34.
108. See e.g. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.,
98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over
International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140 (2009); Paul, supra
note 79; Hathaway, supra note 1; Bradley, supra note 2.
109. Bradley, supra note 2, at 808.
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undertaken without a concurrent evaluation of functional
considerations given the Framers' focus was to create a more
functional government than had resulted from the Articles of
Confederation.110 As the intent of the Framers centered upon
functional considerations, this section will treaty the two factors
simultaneously. Section III of this paper described a post-1909
upward trend of presidential authority that coincided with two
world wars and the Cold War and an "increasingly deferential
posture towards the Executive Branch.""' As the Court wrote in
Chadha, "the Framers ranked other values higher than
efficiency. The records of the Convention and debates in the
States preceding ratification underscore the common desire to
define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers
affecting the states and the people."112 In overriding the
legislative veto, the Court overturned another post-1930 political
creation aimed at expediency by looking to the intent of the
Framers.
The Court in Chadha believed the Framers created an
"unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by
the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and
deliberative process."113 Just as with legislation, the Framers
created a specific, deliberate, and deliberative process for
ratifying treaties. In both these instances, the reverse procedures
were not stated, yet in the case of legislation, presidential
authority has not been asserted as it has with treaty
termination. In Chadha the Court determined that efficiency did
not undercut the intent of the Framers despite Congress having
the final say in legislation, and neither should the Court allow
efficiency in treaty termination to do so.11 4
Some have argued that "[t]he intent of the Framers is
thoroughly ambiguous"115 regarding treaty termination. But
while such an argument may be ambiguous, "even the most
110. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 695, 698 (1995).
111. Bradley, supra note 2, at 827.
112. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
115. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 151.
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cursory consideration would suggest that the argument for
excluding Congress (or the Senate) from treaty termination is
weak."116 Others contend that their intent is quite clear.117 One
such argument arguing for a clear Framers' Intent in support of
unilateral Executive power was given by Senator Jon Kyl in
2002. During floor debate in the Senate over President Bush's
withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Senator Kyl argued "the
preponderance of writings and opinions on this subject [treaty
termination] strongly suggests that the Framers intended for the
authority to be vested in the President."118 Senator Kyl continues
to provide references from Madison and Jefferson regarding the
Vesting Clausel19 and executive power in support120 of his
argument that "[t]he Senate's role in making treaties is merely a
check on the President's otherwise plenary power-hence the
absence of any mention of treaty-making power in Article I,
Section 8. Treaty withdrawal remains an unenumerated power-
one that must logically fall within the President's general
executive power."121 As Professor Bradley points out, "[t]he
Vesting Clause Thesis... is highly controversial."122 Senator Kyl
continues and cites Youngstown in support of expansive
executive power after raising the Vesting Clause Thesis123 but
fails to note that in his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson
specifically refutes the Solicitor General's assertion that "[i]n [the
Solicitor General's] view, [the Vesting Clause] constitutes a grant
of all the executive powers of which the Government is
capable."124 Justice Jackson rebuts this assertion and argues the
Framers were instead trying to curtail executive power.
116. Id.
117. Emerson, supra note 65, at 48-52. See also Charles A. Lofgren, War
Powers, Treaties, and the Constitution, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1987); Bestor, supra note 8; Arthur Bestor, Separation Of
Powers In The Domain Of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution
Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1974).
118. 148 CONG. REC. 4,536 (2002).
119. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
120. 148 CONG. REC. 4,536-38 (2002).
121. Id. at 4,536.
122. Bradley, supra note 2, at 780.
123. 148 CONG. REC. 4,536 (2002).
124. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952).
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If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered
to add several specific items, including some trifling ones. The
example of such unlimited executive power that must have
most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised
by George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration
of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating
their new Executive in his image. 125
Senator Kyl's argument also fails in his reliance upon
Jefferson and Madison. As noted in Section II, Thomas Jefferson
unequivocally stated treaty termination could occur through "an
act of the legislature alone."126 Similarly, responding to inquiries
made by Edmund Pendleton regarding the Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain27 in 1790, Madison wrote concerning the
Supremacy Clause, "[t]reaties, as I understand the Constitution,
are made Supreme over the Constitutions and laws of the
particular states, and like a subsequent law of the United States,
over pre-existing laws of the United States."128 He continues,
"t]hat the contracting powers can annul the Treaty cannot, I
presume, be questioned, the same authority, precisely, being
exercised in annulling as in making a Treaty."129 Madison
concludes his subsequent discussion of breaches of the treaty:
[i]n case it should be advisable to take advantage of the
adverse breach, a question may perhaps be started, whether
the power vested by the Constitution with respect to Treaties
in the President and Senate makes them the competent
Judges, or whether, as the Treaty is a law, the whole
Legislature are to judge of its annulment, or whether, in case
the President and Senate be competent in ordinary Treaties,
the Legislative authority be requisite to annul a Treaty of
peace, as being equivalent to a Declaration of war, to which
that authority alone, by our Constitution, is competent. 
130
Madison contemplates several scenarios and treaty types,
125. Id. at 640-41; see also Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (1855).
126. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 111 (1850).
127. Emerson, supra note 65, at 51.
128. JAMES MADISON, 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON:
FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 524 (1884) (emphasis in original).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 524-25 (emphasis in original).
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even differentiating between normal treaties and those involving
an enumerated power of the Congress, but at no point does he
consider removing parties in the deliberation. Furthermore, "[i]t
should be noted that, in his careful analysis of the treaty
abrogation power, Madison did not once consider the possibility
of the President alone terminating a treaty, even when the other
side had committed a breach of it, which offers an insight into
what the Founding Fathers thought."131 In total, Senator Kyl's
argument is easily disproven and one can firmly reject such an
interpretation of the intent of the Framers.
Opposite Senator Kyl's point is that the Framers intended
the treaty power, both creation and termination, to be a joint
power. The Federalist Papers offer additional perspectives from
John Jay and Alexander Hamilton.132 John Jay focused on the
importance of treaties and the logic behind involving both the
President and the Senate. He espoused the value of their
collective wisdom and understanding of the subject matter acting
in concert to create the best possible situation for the United
States as a whole and not simply for any of the states
individually.33 Jay's and Hamilton's views also overlapped on
the importance of according treaties the status of federal law to
ensure the United States would be bound by treaties and act as
an honorable nation in international relations as opposed to the
weakness of treaty obligations under the Articles of
Confederation.34 Both men also viewed the treaty power as a
concurrent power of the Executive and the Senate.35
Regarding treaty-making and treaty-breaking, Jay believed
"[t]hey who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties
may alter or cancel them."136 Acting jointly, the Senate and the
131. Emerson, supra note 65, at 52.
132. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 4, 64 (John Jay), NOS. 12, 75 (Alexander
Hamilton).
133. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 4, 64 (John Jay).
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 64 (John Jay).
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 379 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Jay continues: ". . .but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only
one of the contracting parties, but by both, and consequently, that as the
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President are responsible for making treaties for the good of the
nation, and it follows that they should act harmoniously in their
maintenance and in their dissolution. In a warning regarding the
separation of powers reminiscent of Justice Jackson's caution
about the Vesting Clause Thesis in Youngstown, Hamilton
cautioned:
The power of making treaties is, plainly, neither the one nor
the other. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting
laws nor to the enaction [sic] of new ones; and still less to an
exertion of the common strength. Its objects are CONTRACTS
with foreign nations which have the force of law, but derive it
from the obligations of good faith... The power in question
seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong,
properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive. The
qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the
management of foreign negotiations point out the executive as
the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast
importance of the trust and the operation of treaties as laws
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of
the legislative body in the office of making them.
However proper or safe it may be in governments where the
executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to
him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly
unsafe and improper to intrust [sic] that power to an elective
magistrate of four years' duration. 137
Just as it would be unsafe to entrust the creation of treaties
solely to the President, it would also be unsafe to allow their
termination through unilateral action. Hamilton quite clearly
believed that while the Executive must be able to negotiate for
the nation, the results of the Executive's efforts must be
tempered against the wisdom of the legislatures that represent
consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever
afterwards be to alter or cancel them." Id. Jay is discussing the treaty as a
contract in this section and taken out of context it is not very illustrative for the
aim of this paper. But taken in context with all of Number 64, Jay very clearly
discusses the President and Senate acting in harmony, it seems obvious that
Jay does not discern any separate power with regards to treaties in either the
Senate or the President.
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) (emphasis in original).
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the people. Just as the good of the nation and the will of the
people must be considered when forming treaties, so must they
also impact the nation's decision on whether to leave those
treaties. If the nation deems it appropriate, through a concurrent
effort of the Executive and the Senate, to form a treaty with
another nation, it follows that a joint effort should be needed to
ensure the good of the nation, and not a single entity, are at the
forefront of the decision to terminate the resulting law.
This focus on joint power also highlights the separation of
powers doctrine upon which the Constitution is built. During the
initial discussions in Philadelphia in 1787, "the treaty power, lie
the war-making power, went almost without comment ... The
draft reported by the Committee [of Detail] gave the Senate both
treaty-making authority and the power to appoint ambassadors.
The sole diplomatic duty given to the President was the power to
receive ambassadors."138 This distinction between the Congress
and the Executive did not hold as the treaty power was
eventually placed within Article II but stipulated as a joint
power. "These shifts in wording and placement hint that the
members of the convention came to view treaty-making and
perhaps the general control of foreign relations as executive
functions"139 which would suggest support for the modern-day
interpretation. But Professor Arthur Bestor, "a most careful
student of the subject,"140 cautions against such a simplistic
interpretation. Professor Bestor argues "the precise meaning of
the words ultimately selected must be ascertained from the
debates themselves, not from a dictionary. Moreover, an
exhaustive examination rather than a mere sampling of the
sources is necessary if an unconscious bias toward present-day
interpretations is to be avoided."141 It is possible to interpret this
change and argue that the "framers might be supposed to have
shown an intention to transfer the control of foreign policy from
legislative to executive hands," and this was in fact an argument
138. Charles A. Lofgren, War Powers, Treaties, and the Constitution, in THE
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 253 (1987).
139. Id. at 254.
140. Id. at 254.
141. Bestor, supra note 8, at 91.
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given by Senator Spooner on the floor of the Senate in 1906.142
But Professor Bestor argues against such an interpretation:
One searches in vain the records of the Convention and the
discussions of the period for the slightest bit of evidence that
the framers intended any such result or that contemporaries
expected the proposed Constitution to operate in this way. No
one hinted that the legislature of the Union was to be deprived
of its long-established authority to instruct the diplomatic
representatives of the Nation. Even the opponents of
ratification did not charge the document with so massive a
surrender of authority to the executive. Had such an intention
been suspected, the outcry against monarchical tendencies
would have been even shriller than it was. 143
In fact, there were substantial criticisms against the treaty
power as it came out of the Committee of Detail, but these
criticisms focused on the "exclusion of the House of
Representatives" and "the absence of any requirement for a
greater-than-simple-majority vote for the approval of treaties."144
These objections both rose from "economic and sectional rivalry"
among the delegates for the states.145 The final compromisel4G for
the treaty clause was meant to have the President "act as a check
on the Senate."147 In Madison's view, "the Senate represented the
States alone, and that for this as well as other obvious reasons it
was proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties."148
The final solution, a "presidential check[,] became the acceptable
alternative once the convention had worked out a method of
electing the President that stripped the Senate of any role in
presidential selection."149 This checks and balances solution was
important for other functional reasons. As Hamilton explained,
142. Id. at 92.
143. Id. at 93.
144. Id. at 93.
145. Id. at 93.
146. See id. at 91-120 for a detailed discussion of the debates surrounding
the Treaty Clause.
147. Lofgren, supra note 138, at 254.
148. 2 THE RECRODS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 392 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
149. Lofgren, supra note 138, at 254.
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the President was much more suited to act in concert with the
Senate in treaty formation, as opposed to the House of
Representatives, The President could act with unity of purpose
and as a single negotiator, whereas "the multitudinous
composition of [the House of Representatives] forbid[s] us to
expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper
execution of such a trust."150 These qualities, "[a]ccurate and
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and
systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform
sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch,
are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so
numerous."151 Functionally, the President as an "Agent" of the
Senate was the intent of the Framers and such a functional
consideration remains just as prescient today as it did in 1787.
Hamilton, also made use of the term "agent" when describing the
President's role in the treaty process.1 52 And as an agent, the
President's responsibility was the negotiation of the treaty which
the Senate would approve based upon its view of the national
interest. Upon the Senate's approval, the President became the
caretaker of the treaty, now law, under the Take Care Clause.153
Given the Framers' view of the President as an agent and the
functional utility of an agent in negotiations and
communications, it seems that they would view the President's
role in treaty termination as that of an agent carrying out the
will of the Senate or the Congress when they determine a treaty
no longer suits the national interest, and not as the individual
responsible for determining whether or not the treaty retains its
value.
The functional considerations of secrecy and speed in
negotiations do not carry over to the case for termination as the
Restatement asserts.54 As Professor Glennon has written, "[t]he
decision to withdraw from a treaty is almost never precipitated
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 425.
153. U.S. Const. art II, § 3.
154. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313, cmt. d
(citing Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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by an emergency that requires. . . secrecy or dispatch; it
represents a question that looms on policy horizons for some
months, one that might benefit from the ventilation of diverse
opinion in congressional hearings and debate."155 The question
then, according to Professor Glennon, is one of initiative, as
"these considerations do no imply that an initial resolution of the
question by the President is improper.15G Professor Abram
Chayes argued to the Committee on Foreign Relations that "It]he
structure of the overall distribution of the foreign affairs powers,
then, seems, at least on first appraisal, to argue for the existence
of an independent presidential initiative in termination."157
However, Professor Bestor argues that a closer inspection of the
Constitutional Congress and the contemporaneous definition of
"Advice and Consent"58 shows that Presidential initiative in
treaty procedures was not the intent of the Framers.159 The
Framers would have understood "that treaties were to be made
by the head of state (in conformity with traditional diplomatic
protocol) but only 'by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate' - therein employing the traditional phrase that connoted
legislative deliberation and decision and executive
concurrence."160 Professor Bestor argues that the critical
difference showing a lack of Presidential initiative is found in the
two usages of "Advice and Consent" in Article 11.161 The
Appointments Clause states that the President "shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint."162 According to Professor Bestor, "[b]y providing so
carefully for the President alone to initiate the appointments,
and by granting him no comparable initiative in treaty matters,
155. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 151.
156. Id. at 152.
157. TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 27, at 311.
158. See Arthur Bestor, Separation Of Powers In The Domain Of Foreign
Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L.
REv. 527, 541-47 (1974) for a discussion of the history of "Advice and Consent"
and its meaning as would have been understood at the time of the
Constitutional Congress.
159. Bestor, supra note 8, at 115-20.
160. Bestor, supra note 158, at 547.
161. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
162. Id.
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the Committee on Postponed Parts (and the finished
Constitution. . .) made a significant distinction, often
overlooked."63 Professor Glennon on the other hand argues:
these [functional] considerations do not imply that initial
resolution of the question by the President is improper. The act
falls within the concurrent powers of the President; it is a
matter concerning which the President's power is initiative and
the power of the Congress (or the Senate) is reactive. 164
But this view of Executive initiative is at odds with "the
procedure that had developed over the years between
independence and the adoption of the Constitution. This
procedure... assumed that it was a legislative responsibility to
determine the objectives of any contemplated treaty
negotiation."165 Whereas the Framers specified initiative for the
President as to appointments, they left out such Executive
initiative with respect to treaties which is in keeping with the
Framers' view of the President as an agent of the Senate. The
Restatement makes the analogy between treaty termination and
the termination of Senate-confirmed appointees in support of
Executive treaty termination.1GG Professor Bestor, citing the
identical phrase from state constitutions, 167 argued:
[t]he persuasive analogy is not between the power to terminate
a treaty and the power to terminate the appointment of a
subordinate, but between the power to terminate a treaty and
the power to terminate (that is, to repeal) a statute. The
reasons justifying an exception to an otherwise controlling rule
- that is, an exception in favor of a Presidential dismissal
power - are applicable in no logical way to the totally different
questions of treaties. 168
To summarize the joint nature of the treaty power with
respect to the separation of powers, "[t]he treaty clause reported
by the Committee on Postponed Parts was designed to make the
163. Bestor, supra note 8, at 117.
164. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 152.
165. Bestor, supra note 8, at 117-18.
166. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 313, cmt. d.
167. Bestor, supra note 8, at 115-17.
168. Id. at 30.
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President a joint participant in the treatymaking process, not to
transfer that process to him."169 As such, the initiative for treaty
termination should also come from the Executive. And while
there are instances of Executive initiative prior to 1978, the
plurality were requests to the Congress to authorize termination
to allow the Executive provided the other party had notice.170
While some may argue that the lack of an enumerated Senate
exclusivity to initiation in the Treaty Clause leaves it open to
Executive initiative, this is not the understanding the Framers
would have had given the contemporaneous meaning of Advice
and Consent. Furthermore, to argue that a reactive role for
Senate or Congress still such an action is to assume that
Congressional silence is acquiescence in treaty termination. This
has not been adjudicated by the Court, but given the
understanding of the treaty power at the time of the
Constitutional Convention, it loses much of its power. If one
accepts the definition of Advice and Consent argued by Professor
Bestor, silence as consent does not hold. Requiring the Consent of
the Senate to a treaty would, as discussed in Section II regarding
the Rule of Equal Formality, also requires Senate consent to
treaty termination. Under such an understanding, silence would
equate to a rejection of the proposal to terminate, just as Senate
silence on a Presidential nominee is taken as Senate disapproval
and Senate silence on a treaty submitted for ratification is also
tantamount to rejection. Given the custom of treaty termination
throughout the 19th century relied upon ex ante Senate or
Congressional approval (except for President Lincoln's action in
1864171), practice would argue that silence with regards to
treaties is tantamount to rejection, not acquiescence.
A final consideration the Framers had in mind during the
Constitutional Convention on the topic of treaties was that the
United States should be viewed as a reliable actor in the
international community of states.1 72 While their focus was
primarily on economics, they acknowledged the importance the
169. Id. at 118.
170. Bradley, supra note 2, at 789-91.
171. Id. at 794.
172. David Gray Adler, The Framers and Treaty Termination: A Matter of
Symmetry, ARIz. ST. L. J. 891, 895 (1981).
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Colonies' alliance with France during the Revolutionary War.
One point of discussion focused on the failure of the Articles of
Confederation regarding treaties.173 The Articles failed to ensure
that all the member states of the Confederation would be subject
to national treaties and the resulting fear was that the United
States would not be viewed as a reliable international partner if
its treaties were abrogated by its constituent parts.174 The
Constitution sought to rectify this oversight through the
Supremacy Clause, thereby specifying treaties as the "supreme
Law of the Land."175 As Senator Byrd illuminated during the
Treaty Termination Hearings, granting the President the
authority to withdraw from a treaty without Senate involvement
would also make the United States an unreliable actor. Treaty
termination must involve the Senate according to Senator Byrd
because:
Otherwise... the Senate could grant consent to the President's
ratification of a treaty, and within a matter of weeks or
months, a new President, newly elected, could undo that
action.
I [Senator Byrd] do not believe that a precipitous reversal of
policy of that nature should be permitted solely on the
judgment, or even the whim, of a single man. It would not be
sensible, it seems to me, to require Senate approval of
ratification of a mutual defense treaty and, at the same time,
permit a virtually immediate reversal of that decision without
Senate approval. 176
The reliability of the United States in the international
system was a concern of the Framers and has remained a concern
throughout the nation's history.77 As Dr. David Adler argues,
"[o]ne primary goal at the Philadelphia Convention was to
restore the reputation of the country with respect to its
international agreements. This concern could hardly have been
eased by placing the termination authority in the hands of a
173. Lofgren, supra note 138, at 242-44.
174. Vazquez, supra note 110, at 698.
175. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
176. TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 27, at 6-7.
177. Adler, supra note 172, at 908.
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single political officer of the government." 178
That concern has resurfaced over the last two years. While
the Framers likely did not envision a world held together by
alliances and the United States as the leader of a liberal world
order, they did see treaties as an important part of the
international arena and credible treaty commitments were a
necessity.179 As discussed earlier, treaty terminations often
represent long-term considerations that would benefit from
careful, collective deliberation focused on the national interest as
opposed to swift, efficient, single-entity decisions. The faith of
other nations that such deliberations would be undertaken with
grave consideration and not the passing fancy of the moment,
lend credibility to American assurances throughout the world.
"The Framers were concerned about the nation's fidelity to
international obligations; accommodating the many sectional
interests, the need to account for the jealously of small states;
and the need for solemn deliberation. They also had an
overriding fear of absolute executive power."180 Given these
concerns, "[i]t is unlikely that they would have been willing to
permit either simple dissolution of treaties, or any termination
procedure which would have ignored these major concerns."181
The intersection of these various functional concerns were at the
center of the Framers' discussions and the concept of unilateral
Executive termination does not remedy these concerns.
The intentions of the Founding Fathers, with respect to the
treaty power, are clear. To secure the ratification of the small
states it was essential that all states had an equal voice in the
treaty power, so that their interests would not be ignored or
sacrificed. Mere participation in the formulation of treaties
would not have secured those interests. The termination of a
treaty could do as much harm to the Framer's jealously
guarded sectional and state interests as the making of the
treaty. It seems then wholly unrealistic to believe that the
Framers would have unbalanced this carefully drafted system
by not providing that the treaty-making power included the
178. Id.
179. Lofgren, supra note 138, at 242-45.
180. Adler, supra note 172, at 908.
181. Id.
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power to terminate treaties as well. 182
These concerns remain valid in the present and based upon
this analysis of the Framers, one can conclude that they intended
the power to terminate treaties as a joint power not to be
delegated for unilateral action by the Executive.
V. CUSTOM
Lastly, custom should be applied to the dispute to trace
various practices of termination through the life of the Republic.
This paper utilizes Professor Michael Glennon's proposed
framework for how the Court decides questions on the separation
of powers.183 Within this framework, Professor Glennon proposes
a methodology for understanding how the Court identifies and
uses custom to solve these issues,184 which it has as early as
1803.185 Professor Curtis Bradley's analysis of the historical gloss
of treaty termination also uses this framework.186
According to Professor Glennon, "[w]hen the Court moves
beyond the text, it is seeking to find a fact that it will treat as the
equivalent of a textual provision of the Constitution."187 This fact
upon which the Court can base a rule188 is analogous "to footsteps
across a common that eventually become a widely used 'path."'189
But before the Court can determine to what rule a path leads it
must first determine whether or not a custom exists. The
framework suggested by Professor Glennon rests upon six factors
to determine whether a practice constitutes a custom.
The first factor is consistency, whereby "[a]n initial
determination must be made concerning when distinct and often
unrelated historical events are sufficiently similar to constitute a
182. Id. at 922.
183. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 36-70.
184. Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).
185. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
186. Bradley, supra note 2 ,at 774, n.1.
187. Glennon, supra note 184, at 122.
188. Id. at 122 n.76.
189. Id. at 128 (Prof. Glennon cites Pitt Cobbett's discussion of international
law custom and uses it as the basis for his analogy).
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custom." 190 This can be difficult for custom as "the circumstances
surrounding historical occurrences must somehow be found by a
court before it can 'apply' such events to the case before it.
Because of these difficulties the requirement of consistency may
devolve into a philosophical inquiry into the substitutability of
elements drawn from various contexts."191 The second factor is
numerosity. Quite simply, "the act constituting a custom must be
repeated more than once, and obviously, the greater the number
of times the act has been repeated, the more probative the
Custom."192 Duration is the third factor. "This consideration
relates to the period of time over which the act has been
repeated. The longer the time period, the more reason to view the
repetition as having authority as custom."193 The fourth factor,
density, "focuses on the number of times an act has been
repeated over the course of its duration; the greater the density,
the more probative the custom."194 Continuity, the fifth factor,
concerns "the regularity with which the act has been repeated
over its duration. If repetition of the act is irregular, so that
comparatively long periods of time occur in which the practices
has not been followed, less reason exists for the act to take on the
authority of custom." 195 The last factor is normalcy. "If an act has
been performed by a number of different Congresses or
presidents, greater reason exists to regard it as custom.
Normalcy ensures that the act was not an aberration attributable
to their personality of certain presidents or congressional eaders,
or to other unique historical circumstances."196 According to this
framework for determining if custom exists, "[t]he consistency
requirement must always be satisfied. Not all of the remaining
five elements discussed above, however, must be present to
justify the conclusion that a custom exists."197 Furthermore, it is
necessary to weigh each of the factors against the others and
190. Id. at 129.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 130.
193. Id. at 131.
194. Id. at 132.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 133.
197. Id.
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determine where upon a spectrum of weak to strong does the
custom in question fall. 198
Once the analysis has answered the question as to a custom's
existence, it remains necessary to examine the custom in light of
opinio juris seu necessitatis.199 "A custom, to be considered
probative evidence of a legislative or constitutional fact, must
have been understood and intended by both branches to
represent a juridical norm; it cannot be simply a series of
essentially random acts that happen to form a pattern of
usage."200 Opinio juris applied to separation of powers "assumes
the concurrence of three elements. First, the custom in question
must consist of act; mere assertions of authority to act are
insufficient. Second, if a coordinate branch has performed the act,
the other branch must have been on notice of its occurrence.
Third, the branch placed on notice must have acquiesced in the
custom."201 When discussing treaty termination, the first two
elements of opinio juris are straightforward as the custom in
question deals with the act of terminating a treaty and as
treaties require notification of termination each branch has
historically been aware of acts regarding termination. In some
cases, one branch explicitly acquiesces to the action of another,
such as a congressional authorization for a President to execute a
specific act. But many cases "will... require a determination of
whether consent can be inferred form the nonaction or silence of
the other branch."202 To this end, Professor Glennon enumerates
four conditions that if satisfied should make it possible to "infer
consent in the relations between governmental branches."203 The
first condition is absence of objection.204 "The Court has insisted
that a notice requirement be fulfilled before it will give weight to
custom. Similarly, it has also required that the practice in
question not have been objected to by the other branch; when
198. Id.
199. Id. at 133-34.
200. Id. at 134.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 138.
203. Id. (the argument for silence as consent draws primarily from tort law
dealing with harm and with assertions of legal rights).
204. Id. at 139-40.
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such an objection has occurred, the Court has declined to view
custom as relevant."205 Second is an institutional capability of
objecting206 which in the context of the separation of powers "is
largely a function of time constraints."207 Utility of objection, the
third factor, "is closely related to the institutional capability of
objection."208 Professor Glennon uses the situation of one branch
facing a fait accompli whereby "there is no point in objecting."209
The last factor is compliance with the Delegation Doctrine.210
"Despite the existence of a custom accompanied by otherwise
effective acquiescence, a court remains free to decide whether the
custom in question violates the delegation doctrine."211 If these
four conditions are met, "opinio juris exists [and] it is appropriate
for a court to regard custom as a fact upon which its decision
might be based."212 The last question that remains after opinio
juris is met is whether "the custom represent[s] a legislative fact,
which must give way in the face of nonconcurrence by the other
branch; or is it a constitutional fact, establishing the acting
ranch's plenary authority over the matter?"213 Professor
Glennon's "examination of Supreme Court decisions in this area
reveals that only those customs dating from the earliest days of
the Republic will be accorded the status of constitutional
facts."214
In his recent review of constitutional custom, or "historical
gloss,"215 Professor Curtis Bradley examines treaty termination
with the aim of "present[ing] the most complete and accurate
account to date of the historical practice of U.S. treaty
terminations. . . and recover[ing] a nineteenth-century
205. Id. at 139.
206. Id. at 140-41.
207. Id. at 141.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 142.
211. Id. (Prof. Glennon also discusses as a subcategory of the Delegation
Doctrine, Noninterference with Protected Freedoms).
212. Id. at 144.
213. Id. at 144-45.
214. Id. at 145.
215. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 610-11
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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understanding of treaty-termination authority that has largely
been lost from modern considerations.216 In his discussion of
historical gloss, Professor Bradley "divides the practice [of treaty
termination] into four categories: termination pursuant to ex
ante congressional authorization or directive; termination
pursuant to senatorial authorization; termination with post hoc
congressional or senatorial approval; and unilateral presidential
termination."217 He also considers "instances in which the United
States ultimately decided not to terminate a treaty after
announcing its intention of doing so, on the theory that such
instances can shed light on the constitutional understandings of
the President and Congress."218
Professor Bradley's detailed analysis highlights the course of
treaty termination and abrogation, starting with the first
instance in 1798.219 The termination of four treaties between the
United States and France occurred ex post to legislation passed
by the Congress and signed by President Adams.220 During the
debate in Congress, "[o]ne member of the House did observe that
'in most countries it is in the power of the Chief Magistrate to
suspend a treaty whenever he thinks proper,' but he noted that
'here Congress only has that power."'221 This debate informed
Thomas Jefferson's A Manual of Parliamentary Practice which
stated, "[t]reaties being declared, equally with the laws of the
United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood
that an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed
and rescinded. This was accordingly the process adopted in the
case of France in 1798."222 Some sources cite this instance as the
216. Bradley, supra note 2.
217. Id. at 788.
218. To analyze the import of custom, or historical gloss, on constitutional
problems, specifically those dealing with the separation of powers, Prof. Bradley
relies on Prof. Glennon's discussion of the Court's use of custom in separation of
powers questions. Id. at 788. See Glennon, supra note 184; GLENNON, supra note
7, at 54-68.
219. Bradley, supra note 2,. at 789.
220. Id. at 789.
221. Id. (emphasis added). Prof. Bradley also notes, "For additional
discussion of the debate in Congress, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in
Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801, at 250-23 (1997)." Id. at 790 n.78.
222. Id. at 799. See also JEFFERSON, supra note 126, at 111 § 52 (1850).
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only treaty abrogation in American history,223 but it is in fact the
"only instance in U.S. history in which the full Congress
purported to effectuate a termination directly."224
Treaty termination continued throughout the nineteenth
century with the involvement of both political branches. In 1846,
"the first time that the United States attempted to terminate a
treaty pursuant to a unilateral withdrawal provision,"225 the
"Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President Polk 'at
his discretion' to terminate a treaty with Great Britain."226 This
resolution followed a request from the President for such an
authorization227 and the Secretary of State informed the
Ambassador of the termination saying, "Congress have spoken
their will upon the subject, in their joint resolution; and to this it
is his (the President's) and your duty to conform."228 The debate
over the resolution centered on whether the House should be
involved, or if only a resolution by the Senate was needed.229
During this debate, "[n]o one argued for a unilateral presidential
power to terminate."230
One debate that began in the nineteenth century and
continued into the twentieth was whether or not the Congress
could order the termination of a treaty if the President was
opposed or if they could order partial termination or suspension
without negotiating an entirely new treaty.231 It was not until
1899 when President McKinley terminated certain provisions of
a commercial treaty with Switzerland from 1850 that one finds
223. TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 27, at 310 (testimony of
Prof. Abram Chayes).
224. Bradley, supra note 2 at 789.
225. Id. at 790.
226. Id. at 790 (quoting Joint Resolution of Apr. 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109, 109-
10).
227. Id. at 790 (quoting James K. Polk, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1845),
in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2235, 2245
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897)).
228. Id. at 790 (quoting S. Doc. No 29-489, at 15 (I s' Sess. 1846)).
229. Id. at 790.
230. Id. at 790.
231. Id. at 791-93. This debate aligns with a view of Senate initiative more
in line with the Framer's interpretation of the separation of the treaty power
between the Legislative and the Executive (See infra notes 160-70 and
accompanying text).
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an instance of unilateral executive action.232 However, this was
not a complete termination of the treaty, only of certain
provisions, and "McKinley's action need not be viewed as purely
unilateral, given that he was responding to a potential conflict
between the treaty and a federal statute. The Tariff Act of 1897
had authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal trade
agreements, and . . . the United States had concluded such an
agreement."233 Despite this ambiguity, President McKinley's
action became the basis for the Executive's assertion of unilateral
termination authority which would grow throughout the
twentieth century, working to change a one hundred and one
year-long precedent of treaty termination as a concurrent
power.234
Following President McKinley's decision, the Executive
Branch moved to define its power. "In 1909, at the outset of the
Taft Administration, the Solicitor for the State Department
wrote an internal memorandum suggesting that it was
constitutionally permissible for the President to act unilaterally
in terminating a treaty ... [ T]he memorandum noted... the 1899
termination of the provisions in the Swiss treaty" as the one
instance of such a power as its support.235 President Wilson's
submission of the Versailles Treaty sparked serious debate in
Congress as to the authority of the Executive to terminate a
232. Id. at 798. In 1864, President Lincoln initiated termination of a treaty
unilaterally but received ex post Congressional authorization. Id. at 794.
233. Id. at 798-99 (footnotes omitted).
234. Historical practice through at least the late nineteenth century
suggests an understanding that congressional or senatorial approval was
constitutionally required for the termination of U.S. treaties. Not only was
Congress or the Senate almost always involved in treaty terminations, but
presidents generally acted as if they needed such involvement. The chief debate
was simply over whether the full Congress or merely the Senate should be
involved in treaty terminations, and historical practice was viewed as relevant
to that debate ... Moreover, at least before the 1899 termination, the Executive
Branch made no claim of a unilateral termination authority. For example, in
the digests of international practice prepared by the Executive Branch in the
late nineteenth century, the materials quoted relating to treaty termination
referred only to termination by Congress.
Id. at 800.
235. Id. at 801-02 (footnote omitted).
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treaty but failed to resolve the issue.236 But despite the
Department of State memorandum and the discussion in
Congress, no unilateral termination occurred until 1927 during
the Coolidge Administration when the President terminated a
U.S.-Mexican treaty on smuggling.237 Unilateral terminations
became more frequent after the Coolidge Administration.238 This
practice continued nearly unchecked until the Carter
Administration, although concurrent action continued to occur
contemporaneously.239
Goldwater v. Carter24O is the most visible action where
members of the Senate actively sought to prevent the President
from unilaterally terminating a treaty, in this case the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Throughout a variety of venues,
from the court room to the Senate floor and committee chambers,
proponents on both sides of the argument used custom and
precedent o support their argument.
In defense of the President's authority, the State Department
prepared a study on the history of presidential treaty
termination as they had in previous instances.241 Responsible for
this effort was Arthur W. Rovine, the Assistant Legal Adviser for
Treaty Affairs in the Department of State, whose responsibilities
encompassed "advising on constitutional and international law
questions with respect to treaties and executive agreements" and
236. Id. at 803-05.
237. Prof Bradley notes that the abrogation of the 1832 Russo-American
Treaty which President Taft terminated occurred after Congress passed a
resolution ex post to the President's announcement of termination. Such an
action resembles precedent established in the nineteenth century. Id. at 805-
06.
238. Id. at 806-10.
239. Id. at 808-11.
240. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (1979).
241. Herbert J. Hansel, Legal Advisor, to the Sec'y of State, Cyrus Vance,
summarized this study in a memorandum in1978. Mr. Hansel was Mr. Rovine's
supervisor within the State Department and the instances of Executive treaty
termination presented in Mr. Rovine's affidavit are the same instances
presented in the memorandum. Memorandum from Herbert J. Hansel, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Sec'y of State, President's
Power to Give Notice of Termination of U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (Dec.
15, 1978) [hereinafter, "Hansel Memorandum"], reprinted in S. COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF POWER, 395 (Comm. Print 1978).
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"for advising on the history of treaties and agreements to which
the United States is or has been a party."242 Mr. Rovine cites
twenty-five cases of treaty termination broken into five
categories243 that can be generally split between twelve cases of
unilateral presidential action and thirteen actions with
congressional involvement.244 To arrive at these specific numbers,
Mr. Rovine used a method of counting whereby "treaty
termination undertaken pursuant to a single statutory
enactment are counted as one case. Thus, the Seaman's Act of
1915, which 'requested and directed' the President to give notice.
• . affected some twenty-five treaties. This is counted as one
instance of Congressional direction."245
In favor of executive authority, Mr. Rovine argued that
"when the President did not act entirely alone, the Congress has
followed no identifiable pattern in terms of the form of its
participation in the treaty termination process, nor do legislative
debates reveal a consistent view on the legal necessity of
Congressional activity."246 As the argument in favor of the
President's authority to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taiwan was based on the presence of a provision within the
treaty to terminate, Mr. Rovine raised the fact that "[t]he first
242. Declaration of Arthur W. Rovine, Goldwater v. Carter, Civ. No. 78-2412
(D.D.C. 1979) [hereinafter Rovine Aft.] reprinted in 2 UNITED STATES FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES, 512-22 (Michael J. Glennon &
Thomas M. Franck eds., 1980).
243. Per Mr. Rovine's Declaration:
These 25 cases of Presidential action to terminate treaties were taken in the
following ways:
a.by the President acting alone (12 times).
b.preceded by some form of Senate action (4 times).
c.preceded by some form of concurrent authorization (2 times).
d.pursuant o statutory directive (5 times).
e.followed by subsequent Congressional action (2 times).
Id at 3. This method of dividing termination actions is like Professor Bradley's
division except Mr. Rovine differentiates between ex ante congressional and
Senate action whereas Professor Bradley combines the two categories into a
single ex ante category (Bradley, supra note 2, at 788).
244. Rovine Aff., supra note 240, at 3.
245. Id at 4 (these 25 instances are as of the study into treaty termination
Mr. Rovine conducted in 1978).
246. Id at 6.
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notice of termination provision did not appear in a treaty until
1822, and the matter of Presidential termination pursuant to
such provisions was first debated in connection with the 1846
notice of termination of an 1827 Convention with Great
Britain."247 However, Mr. Rovine presents no evidence that such
discourse occurred and Professor Bradley's analysis contradicts
Mr. Rovine's statement.248  The legislation authorizing
termination arose at President Polk's request and the
termination occurred through the passage of a superseding
treaty, not as a result of the President's action. Furthermore,
there is no evidence of any arguments in support to the
executive's authority to terminate a treaty unilaterally. Mr.
Rovine also asserts "[t]he pre-1846 period addressed the question
of treaty termination primarily from the perspective of
Congressional egislation superseding treaties" but again without
supporting evidence that there was a change in the dialogue in
1846.249 The debate through the early 20th century continued to
focus on whether termination required the President and the
Senate or the whole Congress to act.250
Mr. Rovine concludes his argument discussing the twelve
treaty terminations by the President. "[O]nly one of these twelve
instances arguably involved treaty violation by the other party..
.; one occasion where statutory policy may have necessitated
termination...; and no cases of impossibility of performance. The
Executive Branch's state reasons for the termination actions in
these twelve cases varied widely, depending upon the facts in
each instance."251 He concludes, "[i]n none of these twelve cases
had the treaty already been terminated or rendered void by
operation of law or changed circumstances."252 Mr. Rovine traced
these twelve cases from 1815 to the 1965, arguing for a long
custom of executive action against inconsistent congressional
involvement.253
247. Id at 6.
248. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
249. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at 6.
250. Bradley, supra note 2, at 794-96 nn. 111-20 and accompanying text.
251. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at 7.
252. Idat 7.
253. Idat 6.
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The voice most in opposition to this executive assertion was
Senator Barry Goldwater. Senator Goldwater introduced Senate
Concurrent Resolution 2 - A concurrent resolution to uphold the
separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches of Government in the termination of treaties254 and was
the lead plaintiff in Goldwater v. Carter.255 During the Treaty
Termination Hearings Senator Goldwater attempted to directly
refute Mr. Rovine's assertions. As opposed to the thirteen
instances of congressional involvement in treaty terminations
acknowledged by Mr. Rovine, Senator Goldwater provided a list
of 52 treaties or treaty provisions terminated with legislative
action.256 The largest reason for the disparity in numbers is that
Senator Goldwater cited all twenty-five treaties affected by the
Seaman's Act of 1915.257 Senator Goldwater also provided his
analysis of Mr. Rovine's argument, specifically the twelve actions
cited as evidence of unilateral executive terminations:
I [Senator Goldwater] have read the argument by the legal
adviser of the State Department, who claims there are 12
examples of Presidential treaty termination. I have examined
each of these incidents in detail and I frankly must say that
they are phony. There was ample legislative authority on the
books for the cancellation of 6 of these 12 treaties. Two others
were not terminated. Another expired because the country with
whom we had entered into the treaty lost its existence and
disappeared as a nation.
The final three treaties expired because they were outdated
and ineffective. They were inoperative under international law
because of unique circumstances and not because of any power
of the President to terminate treaties generally.258
254. S. REP. No. 96-7, supra note 22, at 11-13 (this resolution received no
further action and was not referred out of Committee back to the floor but was
discussed during the TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS).
255. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (1979).
256. S. REP. No. 96-7, supra note 22, at 15.
257. 38 Stat. 1164 (1915).
258. TREATY TERMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 27, at 16 (statement of
Senator Barry Goldwater). See also 125 Cong. Rec. S1891-95 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
1975) (statement of J. Terry Emerson) reprinted in TREATY TERMINATION
HEARINGS, at 17-21.
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The first instance of unilateral executive termination Mr.
Rovine cited was a termination of the 1782 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce with The Netherlands.259 According to Professor
Bradley, "the Executive Branch has sometimes claimed that the
first unilateral presidential termination of a treaty occurred in
1815, but that is erroneous."20 In reality, the Netherlands had
been subsumed by Napoleon into the French Empire and
recreated by the remaining great powers during the Congress of
Vienna.261 The action of the Executive in this case was President
Madison's correspondence with the Netherlands acknowledging
the treaty was "annulled," after the Netherlands suggested "that
the two countries conclude a new treaty based on the terms of the
old one, a suggestion that itself assumed that the old treaty was
no longer in force."262 The second treaty termination Mr. Rovine
cited was President McKinley's termination of certain provisions
of the 1850 Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition
with Switzerland.23 As discussed above, this was not a complete
termination and was arguably "responding to a potential conflict
between the treaty and a federal statute."24 Mr. Rovine's third
case was President Wilson's 1920 termination of the 1891 Treaty
of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with Belgium concerning
the Congo.265 As Professor Bradley explains, "this is incorrect."266
The Seamans Act of 1915 had authorized the suspension of
certain portions of this treaty and President Wilson notified
Belgium of this action in 1916.267 In December 31, 1916,
"Belgium responded by saying that it preferred simply to
terminate the entire treaty, and it asked the United States to
formally acknowledge this denunciation. Eventually, in 1920, the
United States 'acknowledged' Belgium's notice of termination."268
259. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at Exhibit 1.
260. Bradley, supra note 2, at 796.
261. Id. at 796.
262. Id. at 796.
263. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at Exhibit 1.
264. Bradley, supra note 2, at 799. See also supra note 232-34 and
accompanying text.
265. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at Exhibit 1.
266. Bradley, supra note 2, at n. 183.
267. Id. at n. 183.
268. Id.
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The first action from Mr. Rovine's list of precedent that
Professor Bradley considers an actual unilateral termination is
President Coolidge's 1927 termination of the 1925 Treaty with
Mexico on Prevention of Smuggling.269 Of the twelve examples of
the Executive terminating treaties provided by the State
Department, the first quarter are not supported by the historical
record which was clear at the time the State Department
asserted their analysis was accurate. This leaves nine examples
of treaty termination through executive authority, but as opposed
to a near-even split between presidential and congressional
involvement as argued by Mr. Rovine, it is more skewed in favor
of the Congress. Furthermore, if one uses Senator Goldwater's
method of accounting instead of the State Department's, the ratio
is nearly 1-to-6 in support of congressional involvement, yielding
greater numerosity. Yet even the nine instances cited by Mr.
Rovine are not without argument.270
Contemporaneous to Mr. Rovine's study of treaty
termination, J. Terry Emerson, Senator Goldwater's Counsel,
published his analysis of The Legislative Role in Treaty
Abrogation from which Senator Goldwater based his criticism of
the State Department's examination.271 According to Mr.
Emerson, "[s]tarting in 1927, there are nine instances in which
Presidents have given notice of the termination of treaties
without receiving accompanying Congressional authority or
seeking ratification. Upon close examination, however, the recent
record does not support an untrammeled power of the President
to annul any treaty he wishes."272 According to Mr. Emerson,
President Coolidge's 1927 termination was because of "the
disruptive situation of the period, it appears to have been
impossible to implement the Convention."273 Professor Bradley
does not go as far as Mr. Emerson, but he does acknowledge that
President Coolidge's "action was taken after extensive concerns
had been raised in Congress about Mexico's confiscation of
269. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at Exhibit 1; Bradley, supra note 2, at 805.
270. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
271. Emerson, supra note 65.
272. Id. at 60.
273. Id. at 60.
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American property."274 Similarly, of the five treaties that
President Roosevelt terminated unilaterally, Professor Bradley
acknowledges four of them were pursuant to competing
legislation or resolutions in Congress or the notice of termination
was subsequently withdrawn.275 Neither Professor Bradley nor
Mr. Emerson address the fifth instance cited by Mr. Rovine,
which is the "1944 notice of denunciation, pursuant to notice
provision" of the 1929 Protocol to the General Inter-American
Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection.276
However, as of January 1, 2018, this treaty remains in force
according to the United States Department of State.277
Mr. Emerson cites to changes of circumstance and
impossibility of performance which supported President
Eisenhower,278 and previous legislation which supported
President Kennedy.279 The final instance, President Johnson's
274. Bradley, supra note 2, at 805-06.
275. Id. at 806.
276. (2 Bevans 751)
277. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1,
2018, at 523 (2018).
278. This was the 1954 notice of withdrawal, pursuant to notice provision of
the 1923 Convention on Uniformity of Nomenclature for the Classification of
Merchandise, Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at Exhibit 1. "A fundamental change
in circumstances resulting in an actual impossibility of performance was gain
invoked by the United States ... The U.S. notice specifically observed that the
convention had been 'rendered inapplicable' since a fundamental component,
the Brussels nomenclature of 1913, had itself 'become outdated."' (Emerson,
supra note 65, at 62).
279. This case was the 1962 notice of termination, pursuant to notice
provision from the 1902 Convention on Commercial Relations with Cuba
(Rovine Aft., supra note 242, at Exhibit 1).
The President acted under provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the Export Control Act of 1948. Also, he had ample authority to impose a trade
embargo under the Trading With The Enemy Act and Mutual Assistance Act of
1954, known as the Battle Act. Under these circumstances, notice of
terminating the commercial convention was a mere formality mandated by
national policy authorized and sanctioned by Congress .... Finally, Congress
may have ratified the decision in September, 1962, if any ratification were
needed, by enacting the joint resolution knowns as the Cuban Resolution. This
legislation recognized broad authority in the President to take whatever means
may be necessary to prevent Cuba from exporting its aggressive purposes" [sic]
in the hemisphere and to prevent establishment of a Soviet military base. Thus,
the termination was at one and the same time ratified and authorized by
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 14
1965 decision to withdraw from the Warsaw Convention, was
subsequently withdrawn.280 Professor Bradley acknowledges the
Eisenhower termination was unilateral but only cites State
Department Bulletins281 and does not provide as exhaustive a
treatment as Mr. Emerson. Throughout these reputed Executive
terminations, "[t]here were still occasions in this period, however,
in which the United States terminated treaties pursuant to
congressional directive."282 Overall, the evidence presented by the
Carter State Department does not appear to support the
historical precedent they argued existed. Despite this, "[i]n the
years since the controversy over the termination of the Taiwan
treaty, the United States has terminated dozens of treaties, and
almost all of these terminations have been accomplished by
unilateral presidential action."283 As of "2002, the State
Department Legal Adviser's Office listed twenty-three bilateral
treaties and seven multilateral treaties that had been terminated
by presidential action since termination of the Taiwan treaty.284
As Professor Bradley concludes in his analysis of the
historical gloss:
[v]ery likely the change in treaty-termination practice was
driven in part by other changes-such as the increased role of
the United States in the world-that were contributing to the
enhancement of Executive authority across a wide range of
issues. The growth in both treaty-making in general, and the
increasingly widespread inclusion of unilateral withdrawal
clauses in treaties, probably also were factors. But lawyers,
including lawyers within the State Department as well as legal
scholars, also appear to have played an active role in assessing
and influencing the relationship between the constitutional
practice and constitutional understandings. While not playing
a direct role, the Supreme Court also may have helped
facilitate the shift, through its increasingly deferential posture
legislation and in accordance with a treaty.
Emerson, supra note 65, at 63.
280. Bradley, supra note 2, 810 & nn.212-13.
281. Id. at 809 & n. 206.
282. Id. at 810.
283. Id. at 814.
284. Id. at 814-15.
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towards the Executive Branch starting in the 1930s.
2 8 5
The historical gloss clearly points to a shared power of treaty
termination between the two political branches starting soon
after the founding. While the period since the 1930s provides a
narrative for a presidential power to terminate286 and there has
been a clear increase in the number of incidents of executive
terminations,287 it does not seem that this trend represents
custom according to Professor Glennon's framework.288
Furthermore, as Professor Jean Galbraith argues, "the changing
constitutional practice in treaty termination bears little
resemblance to Justice Frankfurter's articulation of the
'historical gloss.' Rather, this practice reveals a far more
dramatic shift than Justice Frankfurter would view as
legitimate."289 In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter
wrote:
The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the
way the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes
that it has operated according to its true nature. Deeply
embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning
to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it
to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss
which life has written upon them.
290
285. Id. at 827.
286. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), § 313, cmt. c (the RESTATEMENT (FOURTH),
for which Prof. Bradley was a Reporter, takes a much less forceful view of the
President's authority, compared to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) and is based on
historical practice and custom in accordance with Prof. Bradley's work (Bradley,
supra note 2) ; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 63, at § 339 (Rep. Note 1.
Basis for President's authority relies less on historical practice and more on the
sole organ thesis). The See also Bradley, supra note 2, for further analysis and
various Executive memoranda supporting this argument for historical practice
in favor of the President.
287. Bradley, supra note 2, at 814-16.
288. See supra notes 184-214 and accompanying text for the discussion of
Prof. Glennon's custom framework for separation of powers disputes.
289. Jean Galbraith, Treaty Termination as Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism,
92 TEX. L. REV. 76, 121-22 (2014).
290. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610
(Frankfurter, J. Concurring).
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While Justice Frankfurter was speaking of a custom of
Executive practice,291 the use of gloss to establish the powers of
Congress has been used with respect to treaties and "[t]he
authority of the Senate to condition its consent to treaties."292 In
the case of treaty termination, the controlling gloss,
paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter, would be a systematic,
unbroken, congressional practice, long pursued to the knowledge
of the President and never before questioned.
The argument supporting a custom of unilateral termination
by the Executive has been used since the first State Department
memorandum in 1909.293 For a custom to exist, it must meet the
six factors laid out by professor Glennon; consistency,
numerosity, duration, density, continuity, and normalcy. Using
Mr. Rovine's memorandum as the bellwether for this argument,
the supporting evidence of an Executive custom of unilateral
termination authority is lacking.294 The consistency of the acts
cited on behalf of Executive power over treaty termination fails
291. Writing of the separation of powers between the three branches of
government, Justice Frankfurter argued for the use of practice, in this case
Executive practice, as a specific source from which to identify the specific
sources of power for each branch:
In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were
such exercise of power part of the Structure of our government, may be treated
as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.
Id. at 610-11.
292. GLENNON, supra note 7, at 124.
293. Bradley, supra note 2, at 801.
294. Mr. Rovine's document serves as a useful point of analysis for
Executive custom for the following reasons. First, it traces the longest path of
Executive treaty termination (Bradley, supra note 2) and therefore has a better
chance of meeting Prof. Glennon's criteria for custom than any other argument
on behalf of the executive discussed in this paper. Second, Mr. Rovine's
memorandum was written at a critical point in the history of Executive treaty
termination. Mr. Rovine discussed thirteen instances of treaty termination from
America's founding to the late 20th century and there has been a significant
increase in Executive treaty terminations since then (Id. at 814-15). The
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan signaled an increase in
Executive authority and arguments in support of this Executive authority often
cite President Carter's action as precedent. It is therefore relevant to discuss
the underlying logic supporting this action when analyzing the entirety of the
custom.
upon closer scrutiny. None of the examples given by Mr. Rovine
are clear examples of treaty termination pursuant to an
Executive act alone with the result termination of a treaty. As
discussed, every termination used to support President Carter's
authority to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan
can be traced to a different legislative source which authorized
termination.295 Per Professor Glennon's framework, "[t]he
consistency requirement must always be satisfied" and that is
clearly not the case with the pre-1978 argument for Executive
custom.296 The numerosity of Executive treaty terminations has
increased significantly since 1978. Prior to President Carter,
there were at most twelve instances of unilateral treaty
terminations by various presidents.297 Since then, "the United
States has terminated dozens of treaties, and almost all of the
terminations have been accomplished by unilateral presidential
action."298 If one accepts the argument of Mr. Rovine and its
expanded justification in the Hansel Memorandum, the custom of
Executive treaty termination traces to the early years of the
United States when the Framers were still alive and involved in
the operation of the government. Yet as this paper has shown,
the examples of Executive acts of termination are not clear acts
of sole Executive action and are in fact largely supported by some
sort of Congressional action. Once these earlier acts are removed,
the action all occurs in the fifty years post-1978, increasing the
density of the acts where "[m]ost of these terminations have not
generated controversy in Congress.299 But as Professor Glennon
notes, "in Chadha, even though Congress had placed legislative
veto 'mechanisms in nearly 200 separate laws over a period of
fifty years,' the use of the device was struck down by the
Court."300 Looking at the entirety of the Executive argument in
support of its termination power, the continuity is sporadic but it
295. See supra notes 259-75 and accompanying text.
296. Glennon, supra note 184, at 133.
297. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, 3, Exhibit 1.
298. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), § 313, Rep. Note 3.
299. Id. § 313, Rep. Note 3 (the Note continues to discuss the 2002
termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia by President
George W. Bush as the exception.
300. Glennon, supra note 184, at 132.
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appears much stronger only looking at the past fifty years where
the Executive has taken the lead in treaty terminations
according to the Restatement. The last factor, normalcy, also
receives support over the last fifty years. It is unlikely that, given
all the arguments against the Executive's pre-1978 example
actions, the Court would find consistency in such an Executive
custom. If the Executive were to narrow its argument to post-
1978, consistency appears much more strongly though the
duration of the custom is greatly weakened. Given the six factors
described above, an argument supporting an Executive custom of
unilateral treaty termination is weak in nature and would likely
be viewed by the Court as lacking, analogous to the argument of
a Legislative Veto custom that the Court dismissed in Chadha.301
If the Court adopted a post-1987 Executive custom of treaty
termination, it remains necessary to determine whether it meets
the requirements of opinio juris seu necessitatis. The first two
criteria of opinio juris, requirement of an act and requirement of
notice, require no discussion. Terminating a treaty is, by its very
nature, an act that requires notice to another party. While this
notification is given to the other sovereign or sovereigns, one may
safely assume that the Congress would be aware of the act given
the public nature of treaties. This leaves the third criteria,
acquiescence. Within Professor Glennon's framework of
acquiescence and its four sub-categories, all four may influence
the Court's decision. The first sub-category, absence of objection,
is cited in the most current Restatement as a factor when
analyzing the Executive Practice of treaty termination.302
Since [the 19th century], almost all actions to suspend,
terminate, or withdraw from treaties have been carried out on
behalf of the United States by the President and his or her
agents acting unilaterally .... For the most part, Congress has
not seriously disputed that the President has the authority to
represent the United States in this manner. Although there
was substantial controversy over President Jimmy Carter's
unilateral termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan
in 1978, the termination nevertheless took effect, and
301. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
302. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), § 313, Rep. Note 3.
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subsequent presidential actions to terminate or withdraw from
treaties have been less controversial. 303
When determining whether a Congressional objection exists,
Justice Rehnquist's point on Justice Jackson's three categories in
Dames & Moore v. Regan3O4 that "it is doubtless the case that
executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one
of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum
running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit
congressional prohibition"305 is prescient. However, debate
remains about what constitutes Congressional silence along this
spectrum, or if the "sounds of silence"306 should even factor in to
the analysis of separation of powers.
In the Court's opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Black
cited the Congress' rejection of an amendment to the Taft-
Hartley Act in the 1947 debate which would have authorized the
seizures in question.307 As discussed in Section II, in its debate on
Senate Resolution 15 in 1978, the Senate firmly rejected the
language from the Committee on Foreign Relations and adopted
the Byrd Amendment, rejecting language supporting the
authority of the President to terminate the U.S.-ROC Mutual
Defense Treaty.308 But as Professor Glennon points out, the
Court sometimes chooses to ignore these events such as it did in
Haig v. Agee.309 Aside from acts upon the floor and a lack of
approved legislation going to the President, there have been two
concerted efforts by individual members of Congress to bring this
issue to the Supreme Court.310 The Court would likely not
construe these acts as evidence that the Congress is not silently
acquiescing, although the floor debate and votes at these times
303. Id. §313 Comment c.
304. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
305. Id. at 669.
306. Alan B. Morrison, The Sounds of Silence: The Irrelevance of
Congressional Inaction in Separation of Powers Litigation, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 17 (2013).
307. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952).
308. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
309. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 317 n.7 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
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may provide insight for the Court.311 "In short, there exist
gradations of objection, requiring case-by-case analysis to
determine whether it is reasonable to infer objection by Congress
as an institution, which would presumably involve a majority of
the membership of each House."312
Given the lack of consistency of any Executive actions prior
to 1978, it seems that no Executive custom of treaty termination
existed prior to 1978 and any such semblance of said custom is
instead a post-Goldwater construction of the Executive Branch,
representing "foreign affairs exceptionalism"33 rather than valid
historical gloss. Should the Court prescribe that a post-1978
custom exists in favor of the Executive, it is unclear how such a
custom would fair in an evaluation of opinio juris given the
ambiguity of both Congressional actions, or inaction, and
uncertainty over how the Court would treat the less-than-clear
acts described in this section.
As for the argument in favor of joint action by the Executive
and some body of Congress, consistency is also difficult to
ascertain upon initial inspection. As Professor Bradley and
Messrs. Rovine and Hansel described, Congressional involvement
311. Professor Alan Morrison argues that, in Steel Seizure, Justice "Jackson
did not rest solely on what Congress had done. Similarly, Justice Black pointed
to several bills Congress had considered which would have given the President
something very close to the power that he used, none of which became law."
(Morrison, supra note 306, at 1215-16). The Justices "seemed to treat the
failure to grant the President hose powers as the functional equivalent of
denying them to him. In other words, inaction equaled action, and congressional
silence was the same as congressional legislation." Id. Some argue that such
voting down of amendments factors in to the conversation on congressional
silence only because the amendments in question were voted upon during
consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. However, the Taft-Hartley Act
(61 Stat. 152) does not include any discussion of the amendments that were not
included in the final text of the bill. The majority opinion in Steel Seizure cites
the Cong. Record and not the enrolled legislation or the U.S.C. in its analysis of
what Congress did not authorize. (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 586 n.3-4. The argument against using votes on the floors of Congress
on certain amendments seems to fail given this use of floor votes in the Steel
Seizure opinion and the lack of supporting documentation in the subsequent
enrolled legislation or statute. Given such use of a negative action to infer the
implied intent of the Congress, the subsequent use of the Cong. Record and
votes on amendments, whether final legislation is enacted, seems warranted.
312. Glennon, supra note 184, at 140.
313. Galbraith, supra note 289, at 123.
in treaty terminations have historically taken a variety of
courses. Termination pursuant to an act of the entirety of the
Congress is the predominant method which can be traced to the
first treaty termination in 1798.314 Such Congressional
authorization extended through the 1920s315 and into the
1970s.316 In fact, such custom still occurs. On February 1, 2019,
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave official notice to the
Russian Federation that the United States would withdraw from
the INF Treaty under Article XV317 given Russia's non-
compliance with the terms of the treaty318 pursuant to statutory
authorization from the Congress. On November 25, 2015
Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
For Fiscal Year 2016.319 Sections 1243(d)(1)(a) and (b) of the
NDAA direct the Secretary of Defense to prepare a plan to
counter Russian violations through the development of
"counterforce capabilities" and "countervailing strike
capabilities" respectively. In this guidance, Congress directed the
Secretary of Defense to create said plans "whether or not such
capabilities are in compliance with the INF Treaty."320 Under
Section 1243(d)(3) Congress allocated funds to "carry out the
development of capabilities. . . that are recommended by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet military
requirements and current capability gaps."321 This action was
314. Bradley, supra note 2, at 789.
315. Id. at 792 (Prof Bradley ends his section on Congressional
authorization in the 1920s but he continues discussing Executive terminations
where he acknowledges that some supposed Executive terminations were in fact
due to statutory conflict).
316. Emerson, supra note 65, at 63; Rovine Aft., supra note 242, at Exhibit
2.
317. Treaty Between The United States of American And The Union Of
Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range
And Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 1, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 12,101
[hereinafter The INF Treaty].
318. See AMY F WOOLF, RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2019).
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reiterated in the 2017 NDAA322 and strengthened in the 2018323
and 2019324 NDAAs which called for the President to make his
determination on Russia's compliance or lack thereof. While the
Executive did not cite this congressional authorization in its
notification of withdrawal, the actions of the Congress show a
continuance of a joint custom of termination.
Joint Executive-Senate action first appeared in 1855 and
reappeared in 1921325 in Professor Bradley's analysis while the
State Department cites four instances.326 The difference between
these two accounts are two treaties terminated by President
Truman. Professor Bradley uses "the Truman Administration's
withdrawal of the United States from a whaling convention" as
an example of "unilateral presidential terminations.., that did
not generate much attention."327 But as the State Department328
notes, President Truman's withdrawal from the 1937 Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling329 was not a unilateral Executive
action as withdrawal occurred pursuant to the Senate's approval
and the subsequent ratification of the 1946 Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling.330 While the second disagreement is less
clear, it is likely that President Truman's withdrawal from the
1929 Convention on Safety of Life At Sea,331 which was
terminated in 1952, was a result of the 1948 Safety of Life At
Sea332 treaty coming into force following the Senate's consent and
its subsequent ratification. Characterizing these terminations as
unilateral Executive action casts the constitutional process of
322. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2017, 130 Stat.
2488, §1231 (2016).
323. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2018, 131 Stat.
1673 §1243(c)(1) (2017) (this section creates a Program of Record for a ground-
launched cruise missile directly in violation of Article I of the INF Treaty).
324. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No.
115-232, §§1243-44 (2018).
325. Bradley, supra note 2, at 793-94.
326. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at 3.b.
327. Bradley, supra note 2, at 809.
328. See Rovine Aff., supra note 242; Hansel Memorandum, supra note 241.
329. 3 Bevans 455.
330. 4 Bevans 248.
331. 2 Bevans 782.
332. 4 Bevans 757 (For full text see 3 UST 3450 or TIAS 2495).
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treaty-making as a sole Presidential power rather than the
shared power written into the Constitution. The Truman
Administration provided the notifications of withdrawal under
the terms of the treaties so that they remained in effect until the
replacement treaties entered into force, essentially conducting
maintenance of the treaties to ensure no duplication existed. The
1937 withdrawal came into effect "for the United States and
certain other parties June 30, 1949,"333 after the 1947 Whaling
Convention "[e]ntered into force November 10, 1948."334
Similarly, the 1929 Safety Of Life At Sea Treaty was
"[t]erminated as to the United States November 19, 1953"335
"[p]ursuant to notice of denunciation given by the United States
on Nov. 19, 1952."336 The date of the notice of denunciation for
the treaty of 1929 is the same date as the date the 1948 treaty
entered into force.337
The last category, Presidential action with ex post
Congressional authorization, encompasses two actions and
highlights concerns in the Senate regarding Executive initiative
in treaty termination.338 The first was President Lincoln's "notice
of termination of the Great Lakes Agreement with Great Britain
(also known as the Rush-Bagot Agreement)"339 which was agreed
to by Congress when "Congress subsequently passed a joint
resolution (which Lincoln signed)."340 The Joint Resolution to
terminate the Treaty of eighteen hundred and seventeen,
regulating the naval Force on the Lakes read "Be it resolved by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
American in Congress assembled, That the notice given by the
President... is hereby adopted and ratified as if the same had
been authorized by congress."341 The debate on this Resolution
raised the question if the Congress was setting a dangerous
333. 3 Bevans 455 at n.7.
334. 4 Bevans 248.
335. 2 Bevans 782.
336. Id. at n.4.
337. 4 Bevans 757.
338. Rovine Aff., supra note 242, at 3; Bradley, supra note 2, at 794-96.
339. Bradley, supra note 2, at 794.
340. Id. at 794.
341. J. RES. OF FEB. 9, 1865, 13 STAT. 568, (1865) (emphasis in original).
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precedent by subsequently authorizing the action.342 One
member, Senator Davis, felt "[i]t is indispensably incumbent and
necessary, in order to secure the termination of this treaty, that
it shall be terminated not by the action of the President, but by
the action of Congress."343 The second act in this category was
President Taft's 1911 "notice to Russia of a termination of a
commercial treaty,"344 although this was the reverse of the 1865
situation. In 1911, President Taft "was concerned that the harsh
tone of the House resolution would needlessly offend Russia" and
he initiated termination only after the House Resolution passed
and "was though likely to pass in the Senate."345 The Senate ex
post passed a Joint Resolution that "adopted and ratified" the
"notice thus given by the President."346
Upon closer inspection, there is consistency between all these
acts. Whether the President terminated a withdrawal pursuant
to Senate authorization, either as a resolution or through its
consent to a superseding treaty, Congressional legislation of a
later-in-time law, or a Congressional law instructing the
President to terminate a treaty, these are all constitutionally-
prescribed methods of creating a law. The only two acts that are
not in accordance with constitutional procedures are the ex post
adoptions and ratifications of Presidents Lincoln's and Taft's
actions, although the former was never carried out and the latter
was initiated because of Congressional action. While there are
multiple routes through which joint action can result in treaty
termination, each route used throughout the history of the
United States have been paths consistent with those created by
the Constitution. Not only is a custom of joint power shared
between the Executive and the Congress consistent, it has
occurred dozens of times347 spanning centuries and nearly every
342. Bradley, supra note 2, at 794. See also Cong. Globe, 381h Cong., 2d Sess.
312-15 (1865).
343. Cong. Globe, 381h Cong., 2d Sess. 313 (1865) (statement of Sen. Davis).
344. Bradley, supra note 2, at 795; Rovine Aff., supra note 242, Exhibit 2.
345. Bradley, supra note 2, at 795.
346. J. RES. PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE TREATY OF EIGHTEEN
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-TWO BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA, 37 Stat. 627
(1911).
347. This count includes the instances cited by Messrs. Rovine and Hansel
and Prof Bradley as well as those they cite that have been subsequently
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Presidential administration and their associated congresses,348
given additional weight to duration, continuity, and normalcy.
Opinio juris clearly exists given the fact that joint
termination was the sole practice through 1927, establishing
more than a century of custom in which neither branch refuted
the concurrency of termination powers. Even in its original
assertion of unilateral executive power in 1909, the State
Department discusses termination pursuant to congressional or
Senate action as the "most effective and unquestionable method'
for terminating a treaty."349 Such a statement shows the
Executive recognized the concurrent nature of the treaty
termination power; they were not trying to argue against
legislative involvement because termination belonged to the
Executive, they simply wanted to establish an expedient method
of conducting foreign affairs. Joint action continues to the
present administration despite the post-1978 surge in unilateral
Executive terminations and there does not appear to be any
significant instance of a President objecting to Congressional
actions calling for the termination of treaties.350
In an evaluation of custom by the Court, any argument for an
Executive custom of treaty termination would appear weak
compared to the much stronger custom supporting joint
Executive- Congressional power over treaty terminations. Given
that opinio juris exists for joint terminations, "it is appropriate
for a court to regard custom as a fact upon which its decision
might be based."351 Finding that such a custom exists does not
preclude the existence of an Executive custom of unilateral
terminations. The Court would have to decide if the joint custom
is "a constitutional fact, establishing the acting branch's plenary
refuted. The numerosity is even greater if one expands the effect of the 1915
Seamans Act and counts each instance of treaty termination which would also
increase the density of events for the early 1900s.
348. As the first instance of treaty termination occurred in 1798 under
President John Adams, only President George Washington's administration is
not included.
349. Bradley, supra note 2, at 801.
350. Id. at 792-93 (the objections discussed here were Presidential
objections to instructions by Congress to terminate certain provisions of treaties
that did not allow for partial termination).
351. Glennon, supra note 184, at 145.
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authority over the matter ... An examination of Supreme Court
decisions in this area reveals that only those customs dating from
the earliest days of the Republic will be accorded the status of
constitutional facts."352 Professor Glennon cites a number of
instances where the Court ruled based on custom dating to the
birth of the nation. "Perhaps custom has been used by the Court
in this manner because a starting point virtually coincident with
the birth of the Nation suggests that the Framers intended to
permit such acts."353 In Myers v. United States354 the Court
explained the logic of gloss and how proximity to the Founders
gave such customs weight:355
This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution
when the founders of our Government and framers of our
Constitution were actively participating in public affairs,
acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to
be given its provisions.356
One such custom dealing with treaties is "the Senate's power
to condition its consent to treaties [which] might be regarded as a
constitutional fact; the custom dates from Senate approval of the
Jay Treaty, with reservations, in 1798."357 The custom of joint
termination by Congress and the President also dates from 1798,
and it is this practice that Thomas Jefferson cites in his Manual
of Parliamentary Practice when he asserts "it is understood that
an act of the Legislature alone can declare them infringed and
rescinded. This was accordingly the process adopted in the case
of France, 1798."358 Given these facts and the length of the joint
custom, it is likely that the Court would support joint action as a
constitutional fact. In rendering its opinion as to how to interpret
such a constitutional fact, the Court should not assume
352. Id. at 145.
353. Id. at 146.
354. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
355. Id. at 161-75.
356. Id. at 175.
357. Glennon, supra note 184, at 146.
358. JEFFERSON, supra note 126, at 111.
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Congressional silence and acquiescence to unilateral Executive
action.359 When interpreting the intent of the Framers on treaty
termination and how they would have viewed such a joint
custom, the Court should recall the words of Senator Warner
during the debate on the Byrd Amendment in 1979:
Those of us from Virginia, whenever confronted with an
interpretation of our Constitution, understandably look to the
wisdom and the guidance of none other than Thomas Jefferson.
I then quote, in conclusion, from the manual of parliamentary
practice for the use of the Senate of the United States, found in
every desk in this Chamber. 360
VI. CONCLUSION
[The Constitution] bestowed on the President and Senate a
shared power to make treaties. There is no historical evidence
whatever to suggest that they intended the correlative power
to terminate treaties to be other than a shared power. And a
shared power is, by definition, a power that cannot be exercised
by one of the partners without the concurrence of the other. 361
The Framers' concern about the credibility of U.S.
commitments discussed in Section IV is one of the motivating
factors behind the NATO Support Act.362 During the bill's
introduction,, Representative Gerry Connolly, speaking in
support of the Act, explained that "Ia]s head of the United States
delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and rapporteur
for the political committee of that assembly, I can attest to the
anxiety within NATO regarding this administration's
commitment to the alliance."363 In closing, he argued "[t]he last
thing the United States should do is send mixed signals about
our commitment, as this President, unfortunately, has done.
From Congress, you will get no such ambiguity. We hope our
allies hear that ... "364 The NATO Support Act passed the House
359. Morrison, supra note 306, at 1213, 1235.
360. 125 CONG. REC., 13,690 (1979).
361. Bestor, supra note 8, at 29-30.
362. NATO Support Act, H.R. 676, 116th Cong. (2019).
363. 165 CONG. REC., H978 (2019) (statement of Rep. Connolly).
364. Id.
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of Representatives January 23, 2019.365 If this Act passes the
Senate, it could set the stage for a legal battle between the
President and the Congress should President Trump wish to
withdraw from NATO.366 Such a confrontation would provide the
judicial test of the theory espoused in this paper.36 7
While it is unlikely that the NATO Support Act will be heard
in the Senate given it was received more than a year ago, the
2020 NDAA contains some language that could support
challenges to treaty terminations. The original House version of
the 2020 NDAA included the NATO Support Act and was
included in the House amendment to the Senate's version.
However, the engrossed bill out of the conference committee
removed the NATO Support Act language. The 2020 NDAA does
not contain NATO Support Act but it does contain two sections
specific to the North Atlantic Treaty36s and a section focused on
the Open Skies Treaty.369 While less forceful than the NATO
Support Act, the 2020 NDAA provides a "Sense of Congress on
Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization"370 and
specifies a "Prohibition on the Use of Funds to Suspend,
Terminate, or Provide Notice of Denunciation of the North
365. At the same time Rep. Panetta introduced the NATO Support Act in
the House, Senator Tim Kaine introduced S.J. Res. 4 - A joint resolution
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate or an Act of Congress to
suspend, terminate, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic
Treaty and authorizing related litigation, and for other purposes (S.J. Res. 4,
116th Cong. (2019)). The Senate Resolution remains in the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations and has not left the committee as of the writing of this paper.
366. The NATO Support Act states in § 3, "[ilt is the sense of Congress that
- (1) the President shall not withdraw the United States from NATO; and (2)
the case Goldwater v. Carter is not controlling legal precedent with respect to
the withdrawal of the United States from a treaty." H.R. 676, 116 th Cong.
(2019).
367. As Prof. Bradley and Prof. Goldsmith point out, it is difficult to
"imagine [President] Trump signing the NATO Support Act into Law. But the
bill passed in the House by a margin sufficient to override a veto, and the bill in
the Senate might have similar support." Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 6.
368. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
369. Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, TIAS [hereinafter Open Skies
Treaty].
370. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No.
116-92 1241 (2019).
Atlantic Treaty."371 This language provides a clear sense of
Congress' intent to remain in NATO and prohibits the use of
funds to withdraw. The presence of such language would clearly
place any attempt by the Executive to withdraw from the North
Atlantic Treaty without Congressional approval in Justice
Jackson's third category. The language discussing the Open
Skies Treaty is less prohibitive. The NDAA requires proactive
notice to both Chambers by the Secretaries of Defense and State
of the Executive's intent to withdraw from the treaty no less than
120 days prior to transmitting such notice to the other
signatories pursuant to the treaty's withdrawal clause.372 This
requirement could place Congress in a position to prepare
legislation to prohibit termination of the treaty should they
disagree with the Departments' assessment that it is "in the best
interests of the United States national security."373
If the Executive provided notice to withdraw from NATO, or
the Open Skies Treaty without providing notification to Congress
as required, the 2020 NDAA could provide standing for a
Congressional challenge. If such a challenge were to occur,
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith argue that under the
framework of Zivotofsky JJ,374 the Court would find the
constitutional text inconclusive alongside case law. However,
they argue that the historical gloss would likely push the Court
towards an exclusive presidential power, as would functional
considerations. All told, they suggest it is unclear how the Court
would decide but seem to suggest it would rule in favor of the
President. This paper argues the opposite. Should such a case
considering unilateral termination of a treaty by the President in
the face of Congressional opposition reach the Supreme Court on
its merits, this paper argues that the Court would likely rule
against such unilateral action and specify treaty termination as a
concurrent power. The Court would likely decide Congressional
involvement is required, either in the form of a Senate
supermajority or Congressional majority.
371. Id. at § 1242.
372. Id. at § 1234.
373. Id. at § 1234(a)(1).
374. Zivotofskyv. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 14
The constitutional text by itself, nor with case law, fails to
resolve the issue of where the power to terminate a treaty
belongs, although it is quite explicit in its creation of a specific
avenue for treaty ratification outside of the legislative process or
Article II powers.
The intent of the Framers, contrary to claims of ambiguity,
clearly reveals their belief that treaties are central to the conduct
of nations on the international stage, that the treaty power is
distinct from other constitutional powers, and that it must be
shared between the Senate and the Executive. They made
deliberation prior to the enactment of treaties critical to the
ratification process so as to ensure the entire nation's interests
were at the forefront of the decision-making process as opposed to
the industrial or agrarian interests of certain blocs of Senators.
To this end, the Framers included the President as a check on the
Senate. They also wanted to ensure the United States was viewed
as an honorable actor in the international community by
elevating treaties and making them binding as the law of the
land. Lastly, they chose language that, to them, clearly made any
act regarding treaties dependent upon the consent of the Senate.
With this effort clear, it does not logically follow that they would
intend for the President to be able to withdraw the United States
without the deliberations of the Senate, or the Congress in its
entirety, upon the ramifications of such a termination. Such a
termination would require deliberate and joint consideration to
ensure termination was in the best interest of the country and a
positive action of the Senate or Congress as has been established
by over two hundred years of practice and custom. While the
Framers may not have foreseen mutual defense treaties375 or
collective security alliances, it does not change their intent or the
framework for the Government they created.
Adding custom to the analysis, one sees a uniform
understanding of a joint power to terminate originated in 1798
which remained in place through the early twentieth century. In
the 20th century, coinciding with the rise of America as a global
power and an overall expansion of executive authority in foreign
affairs, the Executive increasingly argued in favor of Executive
375. Emerson, supra note 65, at 50.
2020] Treaty Termination and the Presidency
unilateralism and its right to terminate treaties unilaterally.
Some scholars and proponents of Executive power argue that the
custom of joint treaty termination steadily diminished
throughout the Cold War and is nearly non-existent. This paper
has shown that contrary to these assertions, unilateral Executive
actions did not truly begin until 1978, but despite the steady
increase in unilateral Executive terminations, joint action has
not yet disappeared. The Goldwater and Kucinich challenges to
Executive unilateralism show some members of Congress have
not entirely acquiesced to the Executive. The NATO Support Act
continues this trend but would notably be the first Joint
Resolution challenging the Executive's authority. Should the act
pass and the Executive challenge the Resolution, the debate
would fall to the Supreme Court to settle this separation of
powers question, just as Justice Brennan argued it should when
the first true case of unilateral Executive termination arose.376
Given the understanding of the Framers' Intent and the path of
historical gloss developed in this paper, along with the logic of a
Rule of Equal Formality in a separation of powers dispute over
the power to terminate treaties, the Court would likely rule that
it is a joint power shared between the Senate or the Congress and
the President. Neither side would have a unilateral authority to
terminate except when that power derived from an explicit power
within the Constitution, such as the President's authority to
recognize foreign nations.
376. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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